JUVENILE CASELAW UPDATE

BY TRACEY MARTIN (WAYNE)

DELINQUENCY
 
CASE: In re NC, Minor, ____ Mich App____ (November 21, 2023), No. 361548, Alger Circuit Court, Family Division LC No. 20-004569-DL Respondent-Appellee
COURT: Michigan Court of Appeals (FOR PUBLICATION)
JUDGES: GLEICHER, SWARTZLE, and YATES
 
ISSUES:
Motion to suppress; Whether a juvenile in a school or a principal’s office is in custody for purposes of the Miranda v Arizona warnings; People v Mayes; JDB v North Carolina; In the Matter of DAH (NC App); Holguin v Harrison (ND CA); MH v State (FL App); BA v State (IN); In re LG (OH App); NC v Commonwealth (KY); In re Welfare of MAK (MN App)
 
SUMMARY:
Noting that no binding Michigan case law had substantively addressed the situation at issue, the court held that the trial court properly suppressed respondent-NC’s statements made to police in the school principal’s office, finding the interview custodial and Miranda warnings were required.
 
As there was no binding Michigan case law on the role of “questioning a juvenile in a school or a principal’s office” in the Miranda custody analysis, the court considered cases from other jurisdictions. Finding those cases persuasive, the court held “that while the fact that police questioning occurred at school or in a principal’s office alone is not dispositive of custody, it is still a highly relevant factor to consider in a Miranda custody analysis involving juveniles at school. Indeed, the movements of a juvenile at school are generally restricted in ways not ordinarily applicable to adults. Thus, that a juvenile was interviewed by law enforcement at school or in a principal’s office, along with the circumstances surrounding the questioning, are relevant considerations in a custody analysis.”

In this case, “the trial court found that the totality of the circumstances supported that” the police chief (N) who questioned him “subjected NC to a custodial interrogation, and” the court was “not firmly and definitely convinced this determination was mistaken.” The facts sufficiently supported that N “subjected NC to a custodial interrogation. Specifically, the location of the interview, NC’s young age, the manner in which the interview was initiated and conducted, the school’s lockdown, and the failure to inform NC that he was free to leave or free to refuse to answer [N’s] questions support that NC was in police custody.” The court noted that NC was 13 at the time of the questioning. He was removed from his classroom by “the principal, who was accompanied by [N], an armed police officer in full uniform.” The trial court acknowledged that “some facts weigh against a finding of custody. But we find no clear error in the trial court’s finding that under the totality of the circumstances, Miranda warnings were required.”
 
Affirmed.
 
CASE: In re Bibbs, Jr., Minor, (September 28, 2023), No. 362217, Wayne County Circuit Court, Family Division LC No. 2016-522864-DJ Respondent-Appellant
COURT: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished Opinion)
JUDGES: Per Curiam - SHAPIRO, M.J. KELLY, and CAMERON
 
ISSUES:
Jurisdiction over juveniles; MCL 712A.2; Sentencing; Delayed sentencing; MCL 712A.18(1)(o); Review hearings in delayed-sentencing cases; MCL 712A.18i(3) & (7); Violations of probation in delayed-sentence cases; MCL 712A.18i(9) & (10); Sentencing as an adult; Youth sentencing; Miller v Alabama; People v Boykin
 
SUMMARY:
The court held that, given respondent’s clear rehabilitation failures and probation violations, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking his juvenile probation and imposing a sentence of imprisonment. When he was 14, respondent was allegedly involved in two carjackings. He and his juvenile codefendant eventually pled guilty to one count of carjacking, and respondent was sentenced to 35 to 180 months. However, the trial court delayed imposing the sentence, and ordered that respondent be subject to juvenile probation in a level-two (out-of-home) placement.
 
He was eventually deescalated to his mother’s home, but later stopped drug testing and went AWOL for 16 months. He was later arrested and charged with felonious assault and felony-firearm. The trial court extended its jurisdiction over respondent until he reached age 21. He pled guilty and was sentenced on his most recent convictions. The trial court ultimately revoked the delayed sentence and imposed a sentence of 50 months to 10 years, with credit for time served, to run concurrently to his new sentence. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his delayed sentence and imposing a sentence of imprisonment. “There is no dispute that respondent violated his probation, thus permitting the trial court to revoke his probation and impose imprisonment.”
 
It found respondent “experienced ‘numerous difficulties while on delayed sentence status’ and clearly violated his probation terms by being AWOL for approximately 16 months, during which he incurred additional criminal charges in Michigan and Ohio. These findings were amply supported by the record.” The same facts supported the trial court’s imposition of an adult sentence. It found respondent “had not achieved rehabilitation and thus presented a serious risk to public safety.” Finally, the court rejected respondent’s contention that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to give due consideration to his adolescence, noting it “appropriately considered [his] adolescence throughout the proceedings, and afforded him ample opportunity to rehabilitate.” It concluded that the trial court’s sentencing decision “adequately recognized the gravity of respondent’s carjacking offense, in light of his failure to achieve rehabilitation during a lengthy period of juvenile probation,” and the trial court afforded him “properly-individualized consideration of the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, and discipline, while still providing [him] the opportunity to demonstrate maturity and rehabilitation to expedite his release.”
 
Affirmed.
 
ABUSE/NEGLECT
 
CASE:  In re MJC, Minor, ____ Mich App____ (November 21, 2023), No. 365616, Oakland Circuit Court Family Division, LC No. 19-879052-NA 
COURT: Michigan Court of Appeals (FOR PUBLICATION)
JUDGES: MALDONADO, BOONSTRA, and GADOLA
 
ISSUES:
Reasonable reunification efforts; MCL 712A.19a(2); In re Hicks/Brown; Whether entry of a no-contest plea as to the statutory grounds waives the right to contest the adequacy of reunification efforts; In re Rood; In re Fried; Effect of the DHHS’s failure to prepare a written case service plan & to regularly update it; MCL 712A.18f; Plain error review; Prejudice; Adequacy of provided services; Child’s best interests; MCL 712A.19b(5); Effect of a relative placement
 
SUMMARY:
The court held that “respondent-father’s waiver of his right to contest the statutory grounds for termination did not also waive his right to contest the adequacy of DHHS’s reunification efforts.” Further, it concluded the “DHHS violated the relevant statutory provisions by failing to prepare and regularly update a case service plan.” But the court found this error did not require reversal because he could not show prejudice given that he was offered adequate services and reasonable reunification efforts were made. Finally, it held that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination was in the child’s best interests.
 
Thus, it affirmed the order terminating his parental rights. The DHHS contended his entry of a no-contest plea as to the statutory grounds for termination constituted a waiver of his right to contest the adequacy of its reunification efforts. But the court noted there was no binding authority supporting this position. While the DHHS cited the lead opinion in Rood, the court noted stating “that the quality of reunification efforts may bear on whether there is sufficient evidence to terminate a parent’s rights is a far cry from saying that statutory grounds and reasonable efforts are so inextricably linked that one may not concede the former but contest the latter.”
 
The court found that “Rood stands for the proposition that the quality of services offered might sometimes be probative of whether a statutory ground has been established.” The court further determined Fried did “not stand for the proposition for which DHHS cites it. The statutory framework makes clear that the Legislature did not intend for reasonable efforts to be linked to the statutory grounds in the manner suggested by DHHS.”
 
The court concluded the reasonable reunification efforts requirement “is distinct from the requirement that at least one statutory ground for termination of parental rights be established by clear and convincing evidence.” It next found that the “DHHS flouted its statutory obligations by failing to prepare a written case service plan and to update” it every six months. But while this was error and it was plain, respondent was not entitled to relief because the DHHS offered him “significant services and made adequate efforts toward reunification; however, [he] was chronically noncompliant and wholly failed to benefit from the services offered.” As a result, he could not show “he would have successfully attained reunification if a proper case service plan had been prepared and regularly updated.”
 
Affirmed.
 
CASE: In re Epps/Jackson, Minors, (October 19, 2023), No. 366064, Wayne County Circuit Court, Family Division LC No. 2023-000405-NA
COURT: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished Opinion)
JUDGES: Per Curiam - K.F. KELLY, JANSEN, and CAMERON
 
ISSUES:
Removal of children into protective custody; Procedural protections of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) & the Michigan Indian Family Preservation Act (MIFPA); In re Morris; “Indian child”; 25 USC § 1903(4); Notification requirements; § 1912(a); Due diligence; MCL 712B.9(3)
 
SUMMARY:
The court held that the trial court did not err by removing respondent-mother’s children into protective custody. The DHHS filed a temporary wardship petition asking the trial court to take jurisdiction over the children. Due to the implications of the ICWA and the MIFPA, the trial court declined to authorize the petition in an effort to allow the DHHS “to notify the applicable Indigenous Nations of the child protective proceedings.” But it also found that temporary removal of the “children was warranted because of the extensive history of domestic violence regarding respondent, the physical abuse of” one of the children, and respondent’s failure to benefit from previously-offered services. On appeal, the court rejected her argument that the trial court erroneously directed removal of her children without affording her the heightened procedural protections of the ICWA and MIFPA.
 
The trial court promptly ordered the DHHS to acquire a genogram from the father of one of the children, “subsequently notify all the applicable Nations of the proceeding, and scheduled a continued preliminary hearing prior to authorizing the petition to determine whether [the child at issue] qualified as an ‘Indian child’ for purposes of the child protective proceedings. The trial court further recognized the heightened standards applicable if” the child possessed Indigenous heritage. However, it determined that the emergency removal of the child, and the other children, “was warranted because of the extensive history of domestic violence featuring respondent, the physical abuse of [the child], and respondent’s refusal to benefit from previously offered DHHS services.”
 
Given that the child “was not determined to be an ‘Indian child’ after complying with” § 1912(a) and MCL 712B.9, the trial court was allowed “to continue the proceedings without affording respondent the heightened protections of the ICWA and the MIFPA, including the requirements of clear and convincing evidence and expert testimony before removal.”
 
While the case “certainly triggered the notice requirements under the ICWA and MIFPA, the remaining protections only become operative once the minor is determined to be an ‘Indian child,’ which did not occur” here. As such, “at no point in these proceedings was the trial court required to comply with the additional procedural protections under the ICWA and MIFPA.”
 
Affirmed.
 
CASE: In re REV, Minor, (October 12, 2023), No. 365482, Osceola Circuit Court, Family Division LC No. 2021-000020-AD
COURT: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished Opinion)
JUDGES: Per Curiam – LETICA, HOOD, and MALDONADO
 
ISSUES:
Termination of parental rights under the Adoption Code; Heightened protections of MCL 710.39(2); In re Lang; In re Mason; Best interests of the child; MCL 710.22(g); Instructions from a prior appeal; Parental fitness
 
SUMMARY:
The court concluded the trial court did not err by finding that respondent-father did not fall within the provisions of MCL 710.39(2). Also, the trial court properly held that he “was unfit and that custody with him was not in the best interests of” his child, REV. Thus, the court found that the trial court did not err by terminating the father’s parental rights under the Adoption Code. He argued the trial court erred in finding that he “did not come within the protection of MCL 710.39(2) because [its] finding that he did not provide substantial and regular support or care in accordance with his ability was not supported by clear and convincing evidence.” It was undisputed that he did not fall within MCL 710.39(2) “pursuant to option one because he has never even met REV.” However, he argued that petitioner did not establish that he “failed to provide care or support in accordance with his ability during” REV’s mother’s (JV) “pregnancy or during the 90-day period before he received notice of the hearing.”
 
Respondent contended the trial “court’s finding that JV was credible was inconsistent with its finding that respondent was able to provide any care or support.” The court determined that there were “multiple problems with respondent’s line of reasoning. Credibility is not a ‘take it or leave it’ proposition; triers of fact are free to believe parts of a witness’s testimony and disbelieve other parts. More importantly, while JV’s testimony suggested that respondent was not working or providing care or support before his incarceration, her testimony does not suggest that respondent did not have the ability to work and provide support. At most, JV’s testimony suggested that respondent chose not to work during their relationship.” Also, while he “was incarcerated he did have the ability to provide some, if not much, support to the child, but he instead did absolutely nothing. This, combined with the history of unwillingness to provide JV support while she was pregnant, gave the [trial] court ample support for its conclusion that his failure to provide substantial and regular support in accordance with his ability was a choice unrelated to his incarceration.”
 
Affirmed.