DELINQUENCY
 
NONE
 
CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS
 
In re O. O. CLAUDIO-PEREZ, Minor, (June 7, 2024), SC: 165711 COA: 360356, Kalamazoo Circuit Court, Family Division, 18-000181-NA
 
Issues:
Termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), and (j), failure to make reasonable efforts toward reunification under MCL 712A.19a(2), In re Hicks, 500 Mich 79, 85 (2017).  What constitutes plain error: In re Utrera, 281 Mich App 1, 8-9 (2008), People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763 (1999), In re Pederson, 331 Mich App 445, 463 (2020), People v Randolph, 502 Mich 1, 10 (2018)(“seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings . . . .”).
 
Summary:
In lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded to the Kalamazoo Circuit Court for further proceedings.  Respondent-mother applied for leave to appeal the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to her minor child, OOCP, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), and (j).
 
DHHS “has an affirmative duty to make reasonable efforts to reunify a family before seeking termination of parental rights.” In re Hicks, 500 Mich 79, 85 (2017), citing MCL 712A.18f(3)(b) and (c); MCL 712A.19a(2). DHHS failed to make reasonable efforts toward reunification. DHHS determined that mother’s lack of medical knowledge was an obstacle to reunification with her medically fragile child.  The Department failed to provide the mother with any training or resources to overcome this obstacle. The trial court’s holding that DHHS made reasonable efforts toward reunification constitutes plain error because DHHS has an affirmative duty to make reasonable efforts to address the barriers to reunification.

DELINQUENCY
 
CASE: In re NC, Minor, ____ Mich App____ (November 21, 2023), No. 361548, Alger Circuit Court, Family Division LC No. 20-004569-DL Respondent-Appellee
COURT: Michigan Court of Appeals (FOR PUBLICATION)
JUDGES: GLEICHER, SWARTZLE, and YATES
 
ISSUES:
Motion to suppress; Whether a juvenile in a school or a principal’s office is in custody for purposes of the Miranda v Arizona warnings; People v Mayes; JDB v North Carolina; In the Matter of DAH (NC App); Holguin v Harrison (ND CA); MH v State (FL App); BA v State (IN); In re LG (OH App); NC v Commonwealth (KY); In re Welfare of MAK (MN App)
 
SUMMARY:
Noting that no binding Michigan case law had substantively addressed the situation at issue, the court held that the trial court properly suppressed respondent-NC’s statements made to police in the school principal’s office, finding the interview custodial and Miranda warnings were required.
 
As there was no binding Michigan case law on the role of “questioning a juvenile in a school or a principal’s office” in the Miranda custody analysis, the court considered cases from other jurisdictions. Finding those cases persuasive, the court held “that while the fact that police questioning occurred at school or in a principal’s office alone is not dispositive of custody, it is still a highly relevant factor to consider in a Miranda custody analysis involving juveniles at school. Indeed, the movements of a juvenile at school are generally restricted in ways not ordinarily applicable to adults. Thus, that a juvenile was interviewed by law enforcement at school or in a principal’s office, along with the circumstances surrounding the questioning, are relevant considerations in a custody analysis.”

In re ZJF, March 10, 2022, No. 356525, Wayne Circuit Court – Juvenile was charged with CSC 1st and adjudicated at a jury trial. Juvenile moved for a new trial, alleging the prosecutor improperly suppressed material evidence in a Brady violation. Juvenile alleged the prosecutor withheld a police report from Livonia which included a statement from the victim in which she told investigators the encounter might have been consensual. Juvenile argued he was denied a fair trial because this evidence could have been used for impeachment purposes. The trial court found that the information in the Livonia police report was simply quoting another police report from the Westland police department and because the juvenile had access to the Westland report, there was no violation.

COA affirmed the trial court. For a Brady violation to occur, one, the evidence must be favorable to the accused because it is exculpatory or because it is impeaching; two, that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and three, prejudice must have ensued. COA ruled no Brady violation occurred and a new trial was not warranted. The Livonia report largely concerned events occurring after and unrelated to the instant case. The relevant portion quoted a report from the Westland police department, not a direct statement of the victim. The Westland report was provided to the juvenile through discovery before trial. Juvenile had the necessary information to impeach the victim. COA further stated the Livonia report was inadmissible hearsay and therefore was not favorable nor material evidence under Brady. And the Livonia report was double hearsay, as it was quoting the Westland report. Because the report is inadmissible, it cannot meet the first prong of Brady.