JUVENILE CASELAW UPDATE

by JAMES PERRY (BAY)

​Child Protection Proceedings
 
Court of Appeals
 
Published Decisions
 
In re L L Gentry, Minor, No 371631, No 376583, Macomb County Circuit Court Family Division, March 18, 2026
 
Best interests case.  Father was convicted in federal court of sexual exploitation of a minor and sentenced to 40 years in prison.  The victims were his child’s half-siblings.  A petition was filed for termination of father’s parental rights.  The first petition was dismissed after two years due to the unavailability of witnesses.  Mother allowed the child to have contact with father while he was prison.  Neither parent told the child about why father was in prison.  The department brought a second petition for termination of parental rights due to mother allowing the child to have contact with father.
 
Father pled no contest to the allegations in the petition.  He stipulated that grounds existed to terminate his parental rights.  Father argued it was not in the child’s best interests to terminate his parental rights because of the length of his prison sentence, that his rights to a child in another county were not terminated, and the child was placed with a relative (mother).  The trial court found best interests, terminating parental rights.
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.  The strength of a parent-child bond is one factor the court may consider – but not a dispositive fact.  Similarly, placement with a relative is a factor for the court to consider but also not dispositive.  The trial court made a sufficient record of findings to allow for appellate review in finding placement with mother did not weigh against termination of parental rights.

​In re L A Ledee, Minor, No 371631, Wayne County Circuit Court Family Division, March 23, 2026
 
ICWA/MIFPA case.  Mother is a member of the Lumbee Tribe.  This tribe was not federally recognized during the case; however, the Lumbee Tribe became federally recognized on December 18, 2025, when the appeal was pending. Court of Appeals held that retroactive notice to the tribe was not required.  ICWA and MIFPA were complied with as notices were sent out when the child was going to be placed in foster care.  The Lumbee Tribe was not federally recognized when those notices were sent out.  ICWA and MIFPA do not apply to tribes or bands that are not federally recognized.
 
In re Berryman/Hurd/Morgan/Morgan-Hurd, Minors, No 374775, Wayne County Circuit Court
Family Division, March 23, 2026 and In re M K Berryman, Minor, No 374776, Wayne County Circuit Court Family Division, March 23, 2026
 
Aggravated circumstances case.  One of the children was shot by a cousin, with mother’s handgun.  Mother was at the neighbor’s house and father was in the backyard.  The department sought termination at initial disposition; however, it did not allege aggravated circumstances existed in their petition.  After preliminary hearing, the trial court did not make findings regarding aggravated circumstances on the record; however, the Order After Preliminary Hearing identifies aggravated circumstances existed due to “improper supervision” and “unfit home”.  Parental rights were terminated at the initial dispositional hearing.
 
On appeal, parents argued that they were entitled to reasonable efforts and a case service plan.  The department argued aggravated circumstances existed, so no reasonable efforts were required.  The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court.  The grounds identified for aggravated circumstances in the trial court’s Order After Preliminary Hearing do not comport with the applicable statutes.  The department did not allege sufficient facts to support or argue during the case aggravated circumstances.  The trial court did not make the appropriate findings to support aggravated circumstances and no reasonable efforts at either the preliminary hearing or at the initial dispositional hearing.  The Court of Appeals discussed the procedure for aggravated circumstances at the preliminary hearing.  In relying on In re Simonetta, the Court of Appeals set the standard as clear and convincing evidence for aggravated circumstances.
 
Unpublished Decisions
 
In re D B H Moore, Minor, No 373464, St. Clair County Circuit Court Family Division, February 12, 2026
 
Aggravated circumstances case.  The child lost weight after birth.  Mother went to appointments but did not follow through with treatment.  Child presented at an appointment and was taken to the emergency room.  Child had, among other things, low blood sugar, rib fractures, and was under weight.  Mother admitted to child abuse in the second degree.  The Department sought termination at the initial dispositional hearing, which was granted.
 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.  The COA held aggravated circumstances were present.  “MCL 722.638(2) provides that aggravated circumstances include when the parent ‘is suspected of placing the child at an unreasonable risk of harm due to the parent’s failure to take reasonable steps to intervene to eliminate that risk,’ without reference to the intent underlying the parent’s actions.”  The child’s low weight was not the result of an underlying medical condition.  Affirmed. 
 
 
In re N K Warren, Minor, No, 375210 Genesee County Circuit Court Family Division, February 12, 2026
 
The child was in a guardianship with mother’s parent.  The guardians sought a neglect petition under MCL 712A.2(b)(6) for mother’s failure to substantially support the child or visit with the child for two years.  The referee authorized the petition and determined the child should not be placed with mother.
 
On appeal, mother alleges appropriate findings were not made to remove the child from her care.  Mother also alleges that the conditions under MCL 712A.2(b)(6) were not met.  The Court of Appeals held the child was not removed from mother or placed in foster care, thus the referee did not need to make findings under MCR 3.965(C)(2).  The child was already in a guardianship and not in mother’s care.  The referee was authorized to release the child to the guardian under MCR 3.965(B)(13)(a).
 
The Court of Appeals held the conditions of MCL 712A.2(b)(6) were not met, reversing the trial court.  Under A, the guardian did not provide evidence that mother had the ability to provide support and did not.  Under B, the guardian had a no contact provision with mother, which required her to take steps under the guardianship court order to see the child.  “The mere existence of conditions that a parent could conceivably satisfy to gain access to a child is insufficient to automatically establish that subparagraph (B) was satisfied.”  The record did not support the referee’s finding that B was found because the no contact order did not provide for visitation upon completing the terms, only that mother could petition for visitation.  Reversed.
 
In re Getzen, Minors, No 374858, Hillsdale County Circuit Court Family Division, February 18, 2026
 
Failure to advise parents of right to appeal removal.  There were two removals in this case.  After the first removal, the parents were not advised of their right to appeal the removal to the Court of Appeals.  The children were returned to mother only to be removed a second time.  At the second removal hearing, the parents were advised of their right to appeal.  Mother argued on appeal that, had she been advised by the court of her right to appeal at the first preliminary hearing, she would have been in a better position.
 
The Court of Appeals found the court had committed clear error by not advising mother of her right to appeal after the first preliminary hearing.  However, the COA then went on to examine whether the failure to advise of appellate rights would have resulted in a different outcome.  In this case, it would not, because the children were returned after the first preliminary hearing and the case was closed.  “The children were removed from respondent’s care the second time because respondent relapsed, self-harmed, and continued to be around men who committed domestic violence. Therefore, the second removal and eventual termination of parental rights were a result of respondent’s actions after the children were returned to her, not an outcome of the trial court’s failure to advise respondent of her right to appeal during the first removal.”  Affirmed.
 
In re Johnson, Minors, No 377487, Berrien County Circuit Court Family Division, February 18, 2026
 
Removal appeal.  The children were removed after an investigation due to domestic violence, neglect, isolation of the children who were not in school, attending medical appointments, or allowed to leave the house, and a pending electrical shutoff notice.  The court made oral and written findings regarding contrary to the welfare and whether reasonable efforts had been provided.
 
On appeal, mother argued the court failed to make explicit findings on the record under all of the provisions of MCR 3.965(C)(2).  The Court of Appeals disagreed, finding the court “made explicit findings regarding the children’s welfare and reasonable efforts, both during the preliminary hearing and through the written order. Although the trial court could have said more on the other three factors of MCR 3.965(C)(2), the record—including the trial court’s oral and written findings—shows that the trial court made ‘minimal but adequate findings’ supported by the evidence for those factors.”  Affirmed.
 
In re Nelson/Cuthbertson, Minors, No 376298, Genesee County Circuit Court Family Division, March 11, 2026
 
Appeal of removal at preliminary hearing.  Placement of a child with a parent is a placement in foster care, under MCR 3.965(C)(2).  The definition of foster care includes placement with a relative.  Relative is defined as “an individual who is at least 18 years of age” and is “[r]elated to the child within the fifth degree by blood, marriage, or adoption”.  The Court of Appeals determined the definition of relative for placement includes a parent.  Affirmed.
 
In re M A Thomas, Minor, No 377023 Wayne County Circuit Court Family Division, April 14, 2026
 
Adjudication appeal.  There were allegations of domestic violence between the parents, including with the child present.  Father was criminally charged with child abuse in the fourth degree and domestic violence.  These charges were later dismissed after father’s plea and taking a domestic violence course.  The child was removed at the preliminary hearing.  At the bench trial, father denied any allegations of domestic violence with mother.  After a bench trial, the trial court found jurisdiction as to both parents and continued the child’s removal.
 
On appeal, father challenged the finding of jurisdiction and the removal of his child.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of jurisdiction but reversed the finding of removal.  The trial court failed to articulate its reasoning under MCR 3.965(C)(2)(b) – alternatives to removal.  The trial court did not have any findings on the record as to whether any alternatives to removal existed.  The trial court also did not create a meaningful record for appellate review as to (e) – whether conditions of custody away from the parent are adequate to safeguard the child’s health and welfare.  The exchange between the trial court and the DHHS worker created an ambiguity as to the safety of the relative placement.  Because the trial court is required to make a finding as to each of the five grounds under this court rule, the decision to remove the child was reversed.
 
As to jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals reviewed two statements by mother made out of court and offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted – namely that she was assaulted by father.  These hearsay statements of mother, disputed as to fact by father, were not admissible as a statement by a party opponent (father did not make the statement offered) or as a statement made for the purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis as to the general cause of the injury (father cannot be the “general cause” of the injury per People v LaLone, 432 Mich 103, 113; 437 NW2d 611 (1989)).  These errors were harmless.
 
In re Foster, Minors, No. 376353, St. Clair County Circuit Court Family Division, April 14, 2026
 
Appeal by DHHS of the trial court declining to take jurisdiction over the children after an adjudication bench trial.  The children made allegations against father for sexual abuse.  Mother, who was a non-respondent parent, had physical custody of the children.  The trial court conducted a hearing regarding the children’s CAC interviews, determining not to admit them.  The trial court found the statements lacked sufficient indicia of trustworthiness.  At a bench trial before the same jurist, the children testified, with the trial court not exercising jurisdiction over father based on the children’s testimony.
 
On appeal, DHHS argued the trial court erred in not admitting the interviews because they were conducted according to the forensic interview protocol and the court abused its discretion by not granting DHHS’s untimely request for a jury trial.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.  The fact the interviews were conducted using the forensic interview protocol did not alleviate the trial court’s requirement to conduct an independent examination of them.  The trial court was concerned with coaching by mother as a basis for not admitting the videos.
 
The Court of Appeals also did not find the trial court abused its discretion by denying the late request for a jury trial.  DHHS argued the jurist was no longer impartial having watched the videos of the children.  The Court of Appeals held the jurist was presumed to be impartial and DHHS had not overcome this burden.
 
In re S Goodloe, Minor, No 377205, Jackson County Circuit Court Family Division, April 22, 2026
 
ICWA/MIFPA case.  Father was added to the case as legal father after Mother’s adjudication.  Father notified the trial court that the child’s grandmother was an enrolled member of the Cherokee Nation.  The trial court did not order DHHS to notify the tribe per ICWA/MIFPA.  Parental rights were terminated.
 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held the trial court erred by not suspending the proceedings until proper notice was made to the tribe.  As a result, the decision to terminate parental rights was conditionally reversed.  If the trial court determined that ICWA and MIFPA applied, then the termination decision would be invalidated and would begin anew under those statutes and their standards.
 
In re W P D Richards-Welch, Minor, No 375634, Muskegon County Circuit Court Family Division, April 30, 2026
 
Termination of parental rights appeal.  The process server provided the notice for the combined adjudication and termination hearing to mother’s grandmother.  The trial court and the attorneys discussed whether that was proper service.  The attorney for the Department argued it was proper under the court rules as it was served on an adult living in the home where mother was living.  The trial court ultimately agreed that it was proper service.  Mother was in the county jail on the date of the hearing.  She was brought to the court and participated in the hearings.
 
On appeal, mother argued service was improper because she was not personally served per MCL 712A.12 and MCL 712A.13.  The Court of Appeals agreed that service on the grandmother was not personal service on mother.  The Department did not seek permission to use an alternative means of service if personal service could not be completed.  Mother did not explicitly waive any defects in service by appearing for the hearing.  Because the trial court lacked personal service, the subsequent proceedings were void.  Reversed.
 
 
Juvenile delinquency
 
Court of Appeals
 
Unpublished Decisions
 
In re JES, JR, Minor, No 372749, Livingston County Circuit Court Family Division, March 11, 2026
 
Appeal of trial court’s decision regarding discovery violations by petitioner.  Petitioner did not disclose photographs or potential body camera video to respondent/juvenile.  Respondent/juvenile was charged with three counts: 1. Assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder – strangulation; 2. Domestic violence; and 3. Domestic Violence.  The trial court reasoned the appropriate remedy for the discovery violations was dismissal of count 1, as the withheld discovery related to that count only.  Respondent/juvenile sought dismissal of all counts.
 
The Court of Appeals held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing only count 1.  The use of sanctions for discovery violations are to be proportionate and just.  The trial court must review all available options other than dismissal, including but not limited to the following factors:
 
(1) whether the violation was willful or accidental; (2) the party’s history of refusing to comply with previous court orders; (3) the prejudice to the opposing party; (4) whether there exists a history of deliberate delay; (5) the degree of compliance with other parts of the court’s orders; (6) attempts to cure the defect; and (7) whether a lesser sanction would better serve the interests of justice.
 
Upon reviewing the factors, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.  Affirmed.
 
In re M J, Minor, No 373450, Iron County Circuit Court Juvenile Division, April 21, 2026
 
Appeal of trial court’s decision not to suppress statements made by the juvenile to the police.  Police observed minors outside a grocery store possibly drinking alcohol.  The minors fled and were apprehended.  Juvenile was questioned during a Terry stop and placed in handcuffs for retail fraud third.  Questioning while in handcuffs continued without Miranda warnings.  Juvenile was found guilty after a jury trial.  The trial court did not grant a new trial based on a post-trial motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to move to suppress. The trial court found that because the first statement was made during a valid Terry stop, it was made in response to reasonable inquiry and not a custodial interrogation.
 
On appeal, juvenile argues her attorney was ineffective for not moving to suppress her statements.  The Court of Appeals agreed.  The statements made even before being placed in handcuffs, based on the totality of the circumstances, were made while in custody without Miranda. The Court of Appeals found it reasonably likely that the juvenile did not feel free to leave based on the factors taken as a whole (including a police chase, seeing her boyfriend’s arrest, and searches and commands from the police officers).  The failure to move to suppress did affect the outcome of the case.  Reversed.