JUVENILE CASELAW UPDATE

BY KELLY WARD (VAN BUREN)

CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS
 
UNPUBLISHED
 
In re MCCLELLAND/THOMAS, Minors, (March 19, 2025), No. 371123, Sanilac Circuit Court Family Division, LC No. 23-036620-NA
 
Respondent-mother appeals as of right the trial court’s April 2024 order terminating her parental rights to the two minor children, CM and JT, pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (b)(ii), and (j). Respondent also challenges the trial court’s earlier order, entered in February 2024, assuming jurisdiction over the minor children. The Court affirmed the trial court’s order of adjudication and the order determining that at least one statutory ground supported termination. The Court vacated the trial court’s best-interest analysis and remanded for further consideration of that issue because the court failed to consider the children’s best interests in light of their relative placement.
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In this case, Children’s Protective Services began an investigation of this family in February 2023 after CM disclosed to adults at her school that she was sexually abused by respondent’s live-in boyfriend, J. Thomas, the biological father of JT. Petitioner, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), sought termination of respondent’s parental rights at the initial disposition primarily alleging a failure to protect her children from Thomas’s physical and sexual abuse.

The Court upheld the trial court’s assumption of jurisdiction over the children under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2). ​ Evidence showed that the respondent failed to protect CM from sexual abuse and JT from physical abuse by her live-in partner ​ The jury found sufficient evidence to support jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. ​

The court affirmed the termination of parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii) and (j), which address a parent’s failure to prevent abuse and the likelihood of harm to the children if returned to the parent’s care. ​ The respondent’s failure to protect her children, lack of insight, and cognitive deficits supported the trial court’s findings. ​ However, the court found that termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) was erroneous but harmless since only one statutory ground is required for termination.

The court vacated the trial court’s best-interest determination because it failed to explicitly consider the children’s placement with relatives, as required by Michigan law. ​ The children had been living with a maternal cousin and his wife, who were willing to adopt them. ​ The trial court was instructed to address this factor and make appropriate findings.

The Court found no error in the trial court’s failure to address the children’s best interests separately, as the risks of harm applied equally to both children. ​
 
UNPUBLISHED
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In re D. D. BURTON Minor, (April 30, 2025), No. 371153, St. Joseph Circuit Court Family Division, LC No. 2023-000014-NA
 
The respondent appeals an order terminating her parental rights to her minor child, D.D.B. The termination was based on MCL 712A.19b(3)(j), which states there is a reasonable likelihood, based on the parent's conduct or capacity, that the child will be harmed if returned to the parent.

The respondent argued that the termination was premature because the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) did not make reasonable efforts to reunify her with her child. The Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed the trial court's decision.

In January 2023, DHHS petitioned the court for temporary jurisdiction over D.D.B. Allegations included the respondent's methamphetamine use, her continued relationship with D.D.B.'s father (who committed domestic violence in the child's presence), and an incident where she sought emergency medical treatment after falling while intoxicated with D.D.B. in her vehicle, where her blood alcohol level was determined to be three times the legal limit.  D.D.B. was removed from the respondent's care and placed with his maternal aunt, and the respondent's parenting time was suspended. At an adjudicatory hearing in May 2023, the respondent did not appear. DHHS caseworkers testified about the respondent's inconsistent cooperation with offered services like drug screens, housing aid, and counseling. The trial court found statutory grounds to exercise jurisdiction over D.D.B. A case service plan was adopted, requiring the respondent to obtain suitable housing, employment, and transportation, refrain from drug and alcohol use, participate in Alcoholics Anonymous or Narcotics Anonymous, complete random drug screens, and undergo various assessments and counseling. Parenting time remained suspended pending her participation. In March 2024, DHHS petitioned to terminate parental rights. At the termination hearing in May 2024, a DHHS caseworker testified that the respondent made little progress on her service plan: she delayed substance abuse counseling, failed to complete most drug screens, did not complete a psychological evaluation, and could not verify engagement in domestic violence counseling or obtaining suitable housing or stable employment. The respondent's parenting time was suspended due to inconsistent engagement in services. She also behaved inappropriately during a supervised visit. The respondent testified that she was attending substance abuse counseling and had not consumed alcohol in three months. She stopped drug screens because they were negative for methamphetamine and denied testing positive for it initially. She chose not to participate in infant mental health services due to fear of judgment. She acknowledged lacking stable housing and recognized the importance of the plan but cited prior trauma and monetary limitations, specifically the inability to afford gasoline, as impediments.

The court found that DHHS made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent with D.D.B. DHHS identified tailored services for reunification, including addressing domestic violence exposure and substance abuse. The respondent, however, did not fully participate in these services despite referrals and offers of assistance from DHHS. Regarding unstable housing, DHHS offered resources, but the respondent did not utilize them or maintain stable employment. While the respondent cited lack of transportation and requested prepaid gasoline cards, DHHS had a limited supply, and the respondent had previously not used a provided card for visitation. Additionally, the respondent was unwilling to engage in certain services regardless of transportation, such as infant mental health services (due to fear of judgment) and drug screens (due to perceived sufficiency of negative results). She also endorsed her decision to drive while intoxicated with D.D.B. The trial court's conclusion that DHHS made reasonable reunification efforts was upheld, and the termination of parental rights was affirmed. The issue of reasonable efforts was unpreserved because the respondent failed to object to the adequacy of services during the initial adoption of the case service plan or subsequent hearings. Therefore, it was reviewed for plain error, which was not found. 

In sum, the trial court did not clearly or obviously err by concluding that DHHS made reasonable efforts to reunify respondent with DDB.  While the DHHS caseworker, Dawn Wolf, could have done more to assist respondent, its reunification efforts were reasonable. 

Affirmed. 

UNPUBLISHED

In re STROUSE, Minors, (May 12, 2025), No. 372806, Muskegon Circuit Court Family Division, LC No. 2019-000032-NA
 
Respondent-father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his four minor children: RS, JS, AS, and KS. The trial court terminated the father's parental rights based on statutory grounds and a best-interest analysis. The respondent-father appealed, arguing that inadmissible evidence was considered, the best-interest analysis was flawed, and his defense counsel was ineffective.

In October 2022, the children were removed from their home due to allegations of sexual assault against AS by the respondent-father and the parents' failure to provide a fit home environment. Evidence suggested the respondent father might have been living with the respondent mother, despite his denials. Both parents' residences were found to have concerning conditions, including pervasive odors, trash, dirty dishes, old food, overcrowded living conditions, inadequate sleeping arrangements, rodent droppings, animal droppings, and a strong odor of cat urine. In June 2023, the respondent father admitted to an amended petition regarding the unsuitability of the housing conditions but denied the sexual assault allegations. An amended petition for termination of parental rights was filed, citing neglect and an unfit home environment, and including allegations from a 2019 case involving lice, bedbugs, other insects, and severe diaper rash on KS. Past substantiated allegations of neglect were also noted. At the September 2024 termination hearing, it was established that the respondent father had made insufficient progress towards reunification, and no prospective adoptive families had been identified for the children. The trial court terminated parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions leading to adjudication persisted for over 182 days) and found it was in the children's best interests, stating they would be able to thrive in a fit environment.

The Court of Appeals found no outcome-determinative error regarding the admissibility of AS's sexual abuse allegations.

The court affirmed the trial court's finding that the statutory ground for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) was met. This provision allows for termination if 182 or more days have elapsed since the initial dispositional order and the conditions that led to adjudication continue to exist with no reasonable likelihood of rectification.

The record indicated consistently unsuitable living conditions in all relevant residences throughout the proceedings, regardless of whether the respondent father lived separately. The respondent father failed to present evidence to rebut this.

Given that unsuitable housing was the primary issue leading to adjudication and had plagued the respondent father in the past, there was no reasonable expectation of timely remedy.

The Court found clear error in the trial court's best-interest analysis. The trial court failed to conduct a thorough and individualized assessment for each child, focusing primarily on general "permanency" while overlooking other essential factors. The lack of identified prospective adoptive families and the children being in different foster placements further compounded this oversight. The court emphasized the duty to decide the best interests of each child individually, considering factors such as the child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting abilities, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, the parent's history, psychological evaluation, substance abuse history, ability to provide a safe home, compliance with the case plan, visitation history, well-being in care, and possibility of adoption.
The Court did not find ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Because of this insufficient analysis, the Court vacated the termination order and remanded for a comprehensive, individualized best-interest evaluation for each child.

FOR PUBLICATION

In re G. MATAMOROS, Minor, (May 14, 2025), No. 371544, Wayne Circuit Court Family Division, LC No. 2018-000423-NA
 
The respondent-father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his minor child, GM, pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (g), and (j).

The Court found that the trial court erred in determining that DHHS made reasonable efforts toward reunifying the father and GM. DHHS never created a case service plan for the father, thus he never had the opportunity to object to it. The father's attorney argued during closing that he wanted a case service plan and an opportunity to benefit from services. The appellate court noted that DHHS's failure to prepare a case service plan as part of its reunification efforts constituted clear error requiring reversal. DHHS alleged the father "failed to benefit from his court ordered services," which the Court found untrue as no services were ordered. Despite communication with the father at various times, DHHS failed to implement a case service plan.
The father claimed DHHS failed to provide specialized services due to his "mental health disability." He had reported having ADHD, anxiety, and bipolar disorder in January 2022 and testified to mood swings, anxiety, and ADHD, for which he saw a psychiatrist and took medication, also receiving supplemental security income. The court cited In re Hicks, which states that reunification efforts are not reasonable if DHHS fails to modify procedures to accommodate a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Since DHHS did not provide any services to the father, the court ruled that on remand, DHHS must provide a case service plan that reasonably accommodates his disabilities as required by the ADA.

Reversed and remanded for DHHS to create and implement a case service plan for the father that reasonably accommodates his disabilities under the ADA. This plan must be presented to the trial court before an order of disposition.
 
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

UNPUBLISHED

In re ASK, AK, AK Minors, (March 19, 2025), No. 371754, 371755, 371758, Macomb Circuit Court Family Division, LC No. 2023-001180-DL, 2023-001248-DL, 2023-001181-DL
 
This case is an appeal concerning the denial of motions to suppress evidence in a case involving a minor identified as ASK. The appeal centers on two main issues: whether a nighttime "knock and talk" conducted by officers constituted a warrantless search and trespass, and whether the warrantless seizure of a Cadillac Escalade from the home's curtilage violated the Fourth Amendment.

This case originated when ASK allegedly drove his parents' black Cadillac Escalade recklessly while someone inside shot projectiles at another vehicle. The victims reported the license plate number, which was registered to respondents' father at their home address. Officer Robert Wathen and his partner went to the home at approximately 10:43 p.m. on a Saturday to locate the Escalade and conduct a "knock and talk."

Respondents' parents answered the door and stated their sons were out with the Escalade. Upon the officers' request, the parents summoned their sons home. ASK arrived shortly thereafter in the black Escalade matching the reported description. Officer Wathen questioned ASK, but gained no useful information, and respondents' father refused permission to search the vehicle.

Officer Wathen then called a detective for approval to seize the Escalade, which was granted. Once a tow truck arrived, Officer Wathen asked respondents' father for the keys to prevent damage during the tow, which was provided. While the Escalade was being seized, respondents and their parents assaulted the officers to prevent the towing. The Escalade was impounded, and a subsequent search warrant led to the discovery of incriminating evidence.
Respondents moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that officers trespassed during the "knock and talk" and that a warrant was required to seize the Escalade from the curtilage. The prosecution argued respondents lacked standing to challenge the seizure of the Escalade because they did not own it, or, alternatively, that exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement applied. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that officers did not trespass during the "knock and talk" and that respondents lacked standing to challenge the Escalade's seizure.

The Court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the officers did not trespass during the "knock and talk." A "knock and talk" is not considered a search if it remains within the "implied license" given to the public to approach a home's front door. While this implied license is "time-sensitive" and can be exceeded by nighttime visits, the Court noted that there is no bright-line rule.

Considering the totality of the circumstances, the Court found the officers' actions reasonable because:The incident involved a shooting and reckless driving.

• The officers approached at 10:43 p.m. on a Saturday, and the porch light was on.
• It was reasonable to infer that the parents of the suspected teenage driver would be awake.
• The officers confined themselves to the driveway and pathway, knocked promptly, and lingered only while speaking with the occupants, consistent with an implied license.
• The specific purpose was to locate the vehicle involved in a recent shooting.

​The Court cited People v Trapp (2020) as persuasive, where a knock and talk before 11:00 p.m. with a light on and occupants awake was assumed proper for investigating an armed man. Therefore, the officers' conduct did not implicate the Fourth Amendment regarding the "knock and talk."

The Court reversed the trial court's decision that respondents lacked standing to challenge the seizure of the Escalade. The prosecution conceded that the Escalade was parked within the curtilage of respondents' home. The Court reasoned that individuals have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their homes, and the curtilage is considered part of the home for Fourth Amendment purposes. Therefore, respondents had standing to challenge the seizure.

The Court concluded that the warrantless seizure of the Escalade was unconstitutional because neither the exigent circumstances nor the plain-view exception applied.

Reversed in part and remanded to the trial court.