DOMESTIC CASELAW UPDATE

BY RYAN O'NEIL (OAKLAND)

Custody
 
Troost v. Troost, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued September 11, 2025 (Docket No. 372188), Montcalm County

The parties married in December 2012 and had two children. They divorced in March 2020, with joint legal custody, primary physical custody to the plaintiff, and liberal parenting time for the defendant. In 2021, defendant’s parenting time was formalized under the Montcalm County Friend of the Court (FOC) policy.

After plaintiff remarried in November 2022 and had another child in 2023, she sought in June 2023 to suspend defendant’s parenting time, alleging emotional and verbal abuse. At the referee hearing, however, evidence showed that CPS substantiated physical abuse of one child by plaintiff and her new husband, Shane Hornbeck. Defendant then sought emergency relief, and the trial court entered an ex parte order granting defendant temporary custody-related relief, barring Shane from contact with the children, and ordering a full custody investigation.

Following an FOC report and an evidentiary hearing, the referee found no established custodial environment with either parent and concluded that defendant proved a custody change was in the children’s best interests. In November 2023, the trial court adopted the referee’s recommendation, awarding joint legal custody, primary physical custody to defendant, parenting time to plaintiff under the FOC policy, and continuing the no-contact order as to Shane.

Plaintiff objected and requested de novo review. After adjournments and a partially granted motion to supplement the record, the trial court conducted a de novo hearing in June–July 2024. The court affirmed the referee’s findings, holding that proper cause or a change in circumstances existed and that awarding defendant primary physical custody was in the children’s best interests. The November 2023 order remained in effect, and plaintiff now appeals.

Plaintiff first challenged the entry of the ex parte order.  The Court of Appeals rejected this argument finding that, pursuant to MCR 3.207(B)(5), Plaintiff was served with the ex parte order and a notice to file objections within fourteen (14) days and schedule the matter for hearing.  Plaintiff filed her objections twenty-one (21) days later and did not schedule the matter for a hearing.  The Cour further found that the trial court complied with Barretta v Zhitkov, 348 Mich App 539, 557; 19 NW3d 420 (2023) by entering an ex parte order after an evidentiary hearing.  The Court further found that the trial court, in complying with MCR 3.215(F)(2), did not unjustly limit Plaintiff’s ability to call new witnesses or present new evidence as part of the de novo review of the Referee’s recommendation.  

The Court of Appeals affirmed. 

Langley v. Langley, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued October 14, 2025 (Docket No. 374295), Huron County

The parties were in a 14-year relationship and had two children, LL and BL. They married in February 2022, separated in April 2023, and plaintiff-father filed for divorce. At the outset of the case, plaintiff faced multiple criminal charges arising from alleged domestic violence against defendant and LL, including assault by strangulation and child abuse, and was subject to a no-contact order. LL testified to repeated physical abuse by plaintiff in 2022 and 2023, including severe incidents witnessed at times by BL. Defendant also testified to domestic violence against her, including an incident involving a firearm shortly before separation. Plaintiff was ultimately convicted of assault by strangulation and domestic violence.

Following separation, both children lived with defendant, who temporarily stayed in a women’s shelter and then relocated near family. Defendant expressed serious safety concerns regarding parenting time. Plaintiff’s parents denied witnessing abuse. The trial court initially ordered limited, supervised virtual parenting time with the father.

The Friend of the Court investigated and recommended sole legal and physical custody of BL to defendant, finding an established custodial environment with her and documenting a long history of domestic violence and CPS involvement involving plaintiff. Plaintiff failed to attend his FOC interview and objected to the recommendation. The parties later reached an interim agreement for limited supervised in-person parenting time with the father, which was briefly delayed but ultimately implemented.

After a bench trial, the court treated the matter as an initial custody determination, found that BL had an established custodial environment with plaintiff, and awarded “joint legal and physical custody of BL, but with plaintiff having primary physical custody.” The court concluded that most best-interest factors favored plaintiff-father or were neutral. Defendant-mother was granted limited parenting time during the school year (one weekend per month) and a rotating-week schedule during the summer. Defendant appealed the custody decision with regard to BL (the parties did not dispute sole legal and physical of LL with the defendant).

The Court of Appeals vacated and remanded the custody order back to the trial court finding that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings that the minor child had an established custodial environment only with Plaintiff. 

Kuebler v. Kuebler, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued October 16, 2025 (Docket No. 374073), Washtenaw County
 
It simply would not be a domestic relations case summary book without this case.  This case marks the parties’ fourteenth appeal arising from a highly protracted custody dispute following their 2017 consent judgment of divorce. The parties share two children, BK and SK. Under the consent judgment, defendant was awarded sole legal and physical custody, and plaintiff was limited to supervised parenting time, based largely on concerns regarding plaintiff’s mental health and manipulative or alienating behavior.
 
Over the ensuing years, plaintiff repeatedly sought to expand parenting time and modify custody, resulting in nearly continuous litigation and multiple appeals. Earlier attempts to obtain unsupervised or expanded parenting time were denied and affirmed on appeal.

In 2021–2022, the trial court modified custody and parenting time to award joint legal and physical custody, including expanded parenting time for plaintiff. However, in Kuebler v Kuebler (2023), the Court of Appeals vacated that order, holding that the trial court applied the wrong evidentiary standard. Because the children had an established custodial environment with defendant, any substantial modification required clear and convincing evidence, not a preponderance of the evidence.
 
On remand, and after reassignment to a new judge, the trial court clarified that defendant retained sole legal custody and continued the existing parenting-time schedule (five overnights in a 14-day period during the school year and a 50-50 split during summers). Following eight additional evidentiary hearings and consideration of the prior record, the trial court found proper cause and a change in circumstances, but also found an established custodial environment with both parents.
 
Applying the clear-and-convincing evidence standard, the trial court concluded that plaintiff failed to prove that joint legal custody or a 50-50 parenting-time arrangement was in the children’s best interests. The court further found that the parties were unable to communicate or cooperate effectively. Accordingly, the trial court denied plaintiff’s renewed motion for joint legal custody and equal parenting time and denied reconsideration. Plaintiff appealed that decision.
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s determination that the request to modify parenting time to a 50/50 schedule and to award joint legal custody—despite the children having an established custodial environment (“ECE”) with both parents—would nonetheless alter the ECE and therefore required proof by clear and convincing evidence that the modification was in the children’s best interests.
 
In analyzing the best-interest factors, the trial court found that the parties remained unable to cooperate or communicate in a manner that would allow them to jointly make decisions affecting the welfare of the minor children. The trial court further found that Plaintiff/Mother engaged in a pattern of interference with the children’s educational, religious, extracurricular, medical, and therapeutic matters, including violations of the court’s orders.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling. 

Carter v. Basir, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued October 16, 2025 (Docket No. 374263), Washtenaw County

This child custody dispute returned to the Michigan Court of Appeals after a prior remand requiring the trial court to determine whether there was proper cause or a change in circumstances and to reanalyze the statutory best-interest factors under MCL 722.23. After a multi-day evidentiary hearing, the trial court awarded the parties joint legal and joint physical custody with equal parenting time.

The case has a long procedural history marked by ongoing conflict. A 2019 consent order granted joint legal custody, sole physical custody to the mother, and parenting time to the father. In the years that followed, the mother repeatedly sought to modify custody and suspend the father’s parenting time based on allegations of abuse, while the father filed multiple parenting-time enforcement complaints.

In 2023, the mother again sought ex parte relief. The trial court modified custody to joint physical custody with equal parenting time, but the Court of Appeals vacated that order because the trial court failed to make the required finding of proper cause or change in circumstances.

On remand, the trial court held a new evidentiary hearing with testimony from CPS investigators, therapists, and school officials. After making the required threshold findings and reevaluating the best-interest factors, the court concluded that joint legal custody, joint physical custody, and equal parenting time were in the children’s best interests.

On appeal, the mother argued that joint legal custody was improper and that the best-interest findings were against the great weight of the evidence.

On appeal, Mother argued that the trial court erred in not finding that she should be awarded sole legal custody as the parties were unable to effectively communicate and/or coparent with one another.  The Court of Appeals rejected this argument finding that the only issue the parties had difficulty in reaching a mutual agreement on was the selection of the child’s therapist. 

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling.  

Green v. Rield, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued October 30, 2025 (Docket No. 368334), Oakland

The defendant appealed multiple rulings in a child-custody and support case, challenging the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff’s standing, denial of an adjournment after his attorney withdrew, the award of attorney fees to the plaintiff, and the use of substituted service. The appellate court found no reversible error and affirmed.

The dispute began in 2020 when the defendant filed a paternity action. Genetic testing confirmed paternity, but although an order of filiation was entered, the defendant failed to remit payment required for proper filing. The case was later dismissed by stipulation. Three months afterward, the plaintiff filed the present action seeking child support and attorney fees, alleging the earlier case failed due to the defendant’s noncompliance with discovery.

One week before trial, defendant’s counsel moved to withdraw; the court initially denied the motion. On the first day of trial, after the defendant fired counsel, the court allowed withdrawal but denied an adjournment, noting the long-scheduled trial date and suspecting gamesmanship.

After a trial conducted over several months, the court found the child’s established custodial environment was with the plaintiff, awarded the plaintiff sole legal custody, granted the defendant parenting time, ordered child support, imputed $65,000 in annual income to the plaintiff, and awarded the plaintiff $81,816 in attorney fees. The defendant appealed, and the appellate court affirmed all rulings.

The Court of Appeals rejected Defendant’s arguments that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case.

MCL 722.720 of the Paternity Act, MCL 722.711 et seq., provides a circuit court with continuing jurisdiction over proceedings to increase or decrease the amount of child support determined by the order of filiation, and to change or enforce custody, support, or parenting time provided for in the order of filiation. Here, plaintiff filed a complaint requesting child support and attorney fees on the basis of an order of filiation entered in a previous paternity action in which defendant was determined to be the biological father of the child. The trial court, therefore, had subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s action.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order. 

Parenting Time
 
Macneill v. McKinney., unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued November 12, 2025 (Docket No. 371521), Alcona County

In this paternity action, the defendant appealed the trial court’s judgment granting the plaintiff sole physical custody of the parties’ child, awarding the parties joint legal custody, suspending the defendant’s parenting time, and ordering the defendant to pay child support. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decisions granting joint legal custody, awarding the plaintiff sole physical custody, and ordering child support, but vacated the portion of the judgment suspending the defendant’s parenting time and remanded for further proceedings because the trial court failed to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that parenting time would endanger the child.

The record showed that shortly after birth the child suffered from severe diaper rashes, which the plaintiff attributed to defendant’s care, alleging infrequent diaper changes, marijuana use while caring for the child, leaving the child unattended in the bathtub, and feeding the child foods that caused allergic reactions. The defendant denied these allegations and testified that she sought medical treatment for the rashes, which she attributed to the child’s skin type. After the parties separated, the plaintiff pursued custody-related relief in the paternity action. The trial court found that no established custodial environment existed and determined that it was in the child’s best interests for the plaintiff to have sole physical custody, with the parties sharing joint legal custody and the defendant exercising supervised parenting time, with the goal of transitioning to unsupervised parenting time.

During the proceedings, the trial court ordered both parties to obtain psychological evaluations after concerns were raised about the defendant’s behavior. The defendant, often unrepresented, failed to provide an unredacted evaluation and did not submit documentation supporting her requests for ADA accommodations. She also moved to disqualify the judge and change venue, alleging bias and due-process violations, but the trial court denied those motions, citing her noncompliance with court orders and inappropriate conduct toward court staff. Ultimately, the trial court suspended the defendant’s parenting time based on her failure to comply with the psychological evaluation order and concerns that she continued to feed the child foods causing severe rashes, and it adopted its prior temporary order requiring the defendant to pay child support. On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that, although the custody and support rulings were proper, the suspension of parenting time was erroneous because the trial court did not make the required finding that parenting time would endanger the child, necessitating vacatur and remand on that issue alone.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s finding that the children did not have an established custodial environment as the parties had only recently separated and had previously coparented from the same household.   

The Court did find that the trial court erred by suspending Defendant’s parenting time without making the requisite findings that Defendant’s exercise of parenting time would endanger the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health. 

The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s parenting time order. 

Change of Domicile
 
O’Brien v. King, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued October 23, 2025 (Docket No. 373429, 373570), Oakland County
 
This consolidated appeal arises from a long-running custody dispute between Monica Lynn O’Brien (plaintiff) and Matthew Joseph King (defendant) concerning their minor child.
 
In Docket No. 373429, plaintiff appealed the trial court’s November 2024 order granting defendant’s motion to change the child’s domicile from Michigan to Illinois and modifying parenting time. The parties, never married, separated in 2018 when plaintiff relocated to Michigan with the child. A 2019 consent judgment granted joint legal and physical custody, with defendant exercising extended parenting time. Over time, disputes arose regarding communication, medical care, and coparenting.
 
In 2022, defendant sought to change the child’s domicile to Illinois, citing concerns about the child’s medical needs and schooling. After extensive referee proceedings spanning more than 30 hearing dates, the referee recommended granting the domicile change. Plaintiff objected, and the trial court conducted a de novo, in-person hearing in February 2024, including an in camera interview with the child. In October 2024 (entered November 21, 2024), the trial court adopted the recommendation, finding the move to Illinois was in the child’s best interests, awarding plaintiff parenting time during school breaks and holidays, and ordering coparenting services. Plaintiff’s efforts to stay the order pending appeal were denied by the trial court, the Court of Appeals, and the Michigan Supreme Court.
 
In Docket No. 373570, plaintiff appealed the trial court’s denial of her request for attorney fees and also challenged earlier discovery and subpoena rulings. Attorney-fee hearings were held before a referee in November 2023, with evidence showing neither party was independently employed and both relied largely on their spouses for support. The referee recommended denying attorney fees, and the trial court later conducted de novo hearings in 2024. The trial court denied attorney fees under MCR 3.206(D)(2)(a) and (b), finding neither party had the ability to pay and that both engaged in misconduct such that neither was solely responsible for the length or cost of the proceedings. The trial court also partially denied plaintiff’s motion to compel financial discovery and quashed her subpoena to a court-reporting service.
 
The appeals were consolidated to promote judicial efficiency.
 
Plaintiff/Mother first appealed the trial court’s consideration of “outdated evidence” that predated the 2022 action. 
 
To support her position that error occurred, plaintiff relies on Kuebler, 346 Mich App at 663-667. But the Kuebler Court did not hold that there is a temporal limitation for the best interests determination. Rather, the Court held that evidence concerning the defendant’s alleged domestic violence against the plaintiff was not relevant because: (1) the conduct occurred before the entry of the 2017 consent judgment of divorce, and (2) the defendant’s purported domestic violence was not at issue at the time the trial court decided the plaintiff’s motion to change custody. Id. at 663-666.
 
The Court found that the history of the parties’ relationship was relevant because it explained and shed light on their lack of trust in one another.  It was also relevant as Plaintiff/Mother failed to properly provide for the minor child’s medical needs, and it was necessary for the trial court to determine if that pattern was continuing. 
 
Plaintiff/Mother further appealed the trial court’s best interest findings in supporting the relocation of the minor child’s domicile from Michigan to Illinois. 
 
MCL 722.23(c) considers “[t]he capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and permitted under the laws of this state in place of medical care, and other material needs.” “Factor c does not contemplate which party earns more money; it is intended to evaluate the parties’ capacity and disposition to provide for the children’s material and medical needs.” Berger v Berger, 277 Mich App 700, 712; 747 NW2d 336 (2008). In this case, the referee, and the trial court both determined that factor (c) favored defendant. On appeal, plaintiff argues that factor (c) should favor her, or at the very least, the parties should be equally favored. We disagree.
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s finding that Plaintiff/Mother failed to provide for the minor child’s dental care for fourteen (14) months.  “Despite being informed that the child had two cavities in August 2020, the cavities were not filled until October 2021, by which time, the child had developed at least one additional cavity.”  The Court of Appeals also slipped in a footnote which provided, “Plaintiff attributed much of this delay to insurance issues and her inability to pay a copay; however, while the child required dental care, plaintiff traveled to Los Angeles, developed her life coaching business, purchased spa treatments, and had her dog groomed. Plaintiff agreed that she failed to communicate effectively with defendant about the child’s dental issues.”
 
The Court further rejected Plaintiff’s arguments that certain pieces of evidence and testimony were ignored.  “But the trial court’s ‘findings and conclusions need not include consideration of every piece of evidence entered and argument raised by the parties.’” MacIntyre v MacIntyre, 267 Mich App 449, 454; 705 NW2d 144 (2005).  Plaintiff also argued that the referee erred by denying her request for in-person proceedings. 
 
The record establishes that plaintiff requested in-person proceedings before the referee on multiple occasions during the evidentiary hearing on the child’s domicile. The referee denied plaintiff’s requests, in large part citing defendant’s location in Illinois and the referee’s inability to accommodate a hybrid proceeding. Even assuming this was error, the referee’s decision to deny plaintiff’s request for an in-person proceeding did not impact the outcome of this case. The referee stated on the record, “The one nice thing about Zoom, even though I know people think it’s the opposite, is that I can actually see all the witnesses much easier this way.”
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s domicile/custody order. 
 
Child Support
 
Heaton v. Heaton, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued November 12, 2025 (Docket No. 374616), Lapeer County

The parties are the parents of three children born during their marriage; two are now adults. This appeal concerns custody of the youngest child, MJH, who turned 18 on October 17, 2025.

In January 2024, plaintiff left the marital home in Lapeer with MJH, then age 16, disenrolled him from his Lapeer high school, and enrolled him in a school near their new residence in Davison. Plaintiff subsequently filed for separate maintenance, and defendant—who represented himself—filed a counterclaim for divorce. Plaintiff was represented by counsel.

Following multiple motions regarding custody and parenting time, the trial court permitted MJH to remain in plaintiff’s custody and denied defendant parenting time. After a bench trial, the court awarded plaintiff sole legal and physical custody of MJH. Over defendant’s objections, the court entered the judgment of divorce and Uniform Child Support Order as drafted by plaintiff’s counsel. On appeal, defendant challenges numerous alleged errors in the judgment and UCSO.

With regards to child support, Defendant objected that Plaintiff failed to provide documentation of her income while Defendant was required to provide proof of his income.  Plaintiff’s counsel argued that Defendant had a chance, during trial, to question Plaintiff about her income – but that time had since passed and the proposed UCSO should be entered by the trial court. 

The record is devoid of any findings of fact as to the parties’ respective incomes used to calculate the amount of support ordered in the UCSO. At trial, the parties testified as to their hourly wages, but the trial court made no findings on the record indicating it based the support award on those amounts. The UCSO does not list the parties’ incomes.

The UCSO was vacated and the matter was remanded back to the trial court. 

Procedural

Broadnax v. Broadnax, Jr, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued October 27, 2025 (Docket No. 372707), Oakland County

The parties married in 1983 and acquired a marital home, a boat, and two rental properties during the marriage. Plaintiff worked part-time; defendant worked full-time, owned and operated a business, and managed the rental properties. Plaintiff filed for divorce in 2021. The parties stipulated to binding arbitration to resolve property division, valuation and division of defendant’s business, spousal support, and marital debt.

After hearings, the arbitrator awarded plaintiff the marital home and awarded defendant the boat and rental properties. The parties were made separately responsible for their own unpaid income tax liabilities, with defendant responsible for tax debt related to his business. The arbitrator set incomes and ordered defendant to pay $2,300 per month in modifiable spousal support.

Both parties moved to correct alleged errors; defendant challenged the property division, tax allocation, income findings, and spousal support, while plaintiff argued the business was undervalued. The arbitrator denied both motions. Defendant then sought to vacate or modify the award in the trial court, arguing the arbitrator exceeded his authority and made legal and equitable errors. The trial court denied relief and reconsideration.

Plaintiff moved for entry of the judgment of divorce, which the trial court entered consistent with the arbitration award, along with a $2,300 monthly uniform spousal support order. Defendant appealed.

The Court of Appeals swiftly rejected the claims raised by Defendant on appeal.  Defendant argued that the arbitrator failed to use the Sparks factors in awarding the property distribution, when the arbitrator’s findings clearly articulated the Sparks factors.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s entry of the divorce judgment. 

Eke v. Festus, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued December 16, 2025 (Docket No. 371394, 372981), Wayne County
 
Elizabeth Oghenereke-Omavuezi Eke (wife) and Bobby Festus (husband) divorced pursuant to a consent judgment that divided their marital estate, including their business, marital home, and a vehicle.
 
Under the judgment, wife was required to buy out husband’s interest in their company, Omega Staffing Solutions, Inc., for $450,000, payable in four installments between February and December 2023, with an option to satisfy the obligation for $400,000 if paid by May 31, 2023. The parties also agreed to sell the marital home immediately, split the net proceeds equally, and award husband an additional $12,000 from the sale proceeds for attorney fees upon proof of the obligation. Wife further agreed to transfer title of a Mercedes vehicle to husband after paying off the loan.
 
The consent judgment acknowledged that husband had substantial outstanding IRS tax liabilities and provided that he was solely responsible for that debt and would hold wife harmless.
 
After wife made the first $120,000 installment payment for Omega Staffing, but before the home sold, the IRS served wife with a notice of levy seeking payment of husband’s tax debt, which exceeded $384,000. Three days later, the marital home sold, and wife received $56,662.26 in proceeds. In light of the levy, wife did not make further payments to husband and instead sought to modify the judgment to allow compliance with federal tax law. After receiving a final notice of levy threatening personal liability, wife paid $320,331.13 to the IRS.

Husband moved for an order to show cause, asserting wife improperly failed to make the remaining payments under the consent judgment, wrongfully paid the IRS, and caused him to incur $2,758.23 in sales tax on the Mercedes transfer. Wife responded that she was legally required to comply with the IRS levy, that federal law and the Supremacy Clause barred enforcement of the judgment in conflict with the levy, and that the consent judgment did not address tax consequences of the vehicle transfer.
 
The trial court partially granted husband’s motion, ordering wife to pay the Mercedes sales tax, $28,331.13 representing husband’s share of the home-sale proceeds, and $12,000 in attorney fees, concluding—without explanation—that the latter two amounts were not subject to the IRS levy. The court denied wife’s motion to modify the judgment, ruling modification was unnecessary because wife would receive credit for payments made to the IRS under the hold-harmless provision. After denial of reconsideration, wife appealed.

“Federal preemption of state law is grounded in the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, which invalidates state laws that interfere with, or are contrary to, federal law.” TerBeek v City of Wyoming, 495 Mich 1, 10; 846 NW2d 531 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[F]ederal law conflicts with state law where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Henry v Laborers’ Local 1191, 495 Mich 260, 275 n 32; 848 NW2d 130 (2014)

The Supreme Court of the United States has held “that [t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States.” Rose v Rose, 481 US 619, 625; 107 S Ct 2029; 95 L Ed 2d 599 (1987) (quotation marks and citations omitted; alteration in original). “On the rare occasion when state family law has come into conflict with a federal statute,” a court must determine “whether Congress has positively required by direct enactment that state law be pre-empted.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). “Before a state law governing domestic relations will be overridden, it must do major damage to clear and substantial federal interests.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). See also Biondo, 291 Mich App at 724

[A] third party who honors a levy, and surrenders property to the IRS, is “ ‘discharged from any obligation or liability to the delinquent taxpayer with respect to such property or rights to property arising from such surrender or payment.’ ” United States v Gen Motors Corp, 929 F2d 249, 251 (CA 6, 1991), quoting 26 USC 6332(e).

The Court of Appeals rejected Husband’s claim that Wife should have opposed the levy.  Once it was served, Wife had a legal obligation to comply.  The tax levy issue was remanded back to the trial court to consider the actual amounts paid by Wife and for Wife to be given credit for the amounts paid. 

Wife also challenged the trial court’s findings regarding contempt.

Here, the trial court sought to coerce wife to comply with the terms of the consent judgment of divorce, rather than acting to punish wife for past misconduct that offended the court’s dignity and undermined its authority. The distinctions between civil and criminal contempt make it clear that, regardless of the parties’ labeling of the contempt proceedings as criminal, the trial court actually intended to hold wife in civil contempt—not criminal contempt. See In re Contempt of Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 243 Mich App 697, 711-713; 624 NW2d 443 (2000) (In re Contempt of ACIA) (distinguishing between civil and criminal contempt). See also Porter, 285 Mich App at 455-456.

The Court of Appeals found that Husband did not meet his burden to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Wife violated the terms of the judgment and vacated that portion of the trial court’s order. ​