DOMESTIC CASELAW UPDATE

BY RYAN O'NEIL (OAKLAND)

Custody
 
Davidson v. Hance, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 20, 2025 (Docket No. 372960), Newaygo County.

The parties, who are the unmarried parents of a child, EH, initially disputed custody after the plaintiff filed for joint physical and legal custody in 2019. They eventually agreed to joint legal custody, with Mother having primary physical custody and Father receiving regular parenting time. However, their relationship remained contentious, especially regarding EH’s ongoing toileting issues, medical care, and schooling decisions. Due to their inability to cooperate, the trial court issued multiple orders to manage medical care, information sharing through Our Family Wizard (OFW), and educational decisions.

In April 2024, Father filed an ex parte motion alleging that Mother was medically neglecting EH by failing to follow court orders and medical recommendations, particularly related to EH’s toileting issues. While the trial court denied Father’s request for temporary full custody, it granted an alternative ex parte order giving Father extended parenting time and sole legal custody, while limiting Mother’s parenting time.

Mother objected to this ex parte order, arguing it was issued without a hearing or proper findings. The trial court referred the matter to a referee and instructed Father to formally move for a custody change. Following a two-day hearing, the referee recommended awarding Father primary physical and sole legal custody, and awarding Mother parenting time under the Friend of the Court schedule. The trial court adopted these recommendations, citing EH’s healthcare needs and the parents’ ongoing inability to effectively coparent. Mother appealed the decision.
Mother first challenged the issuance of the ex parte order, arguing that it modified legal and physical custody without any prior findings. The Court of Appeals ruled that, by granting Father extended parenting time via an ex parte order, the trial court effectively modified Mother's award of primary physical custody. However, the Court of Appeals found this error to be harmless because both the referee and the trial court later made rulings based on the parties’ longstanding inability to agree on medical decisions for the minor child. Additionally, the referee and trial court found that an established custodial environment existed with both parties, and that the circumstances of that environment were not the result of the ex parte order.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling. 

Tyus v. Al-Esawi, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 19, 2025 (Docket No. 371989), Oakland County.
 
Father filed a custody action seeking joint legal custody of the parties’ minor child.  Mother sought an award of sole legal custody.  The trial court found that the minor child had an established custodial environment with Mother but found that it was in the child’s best interests, despite the history of domestic violence in this case, for the parties to be awarded joint legal custody. 
 
When considering an important decision affecting the welfare of the child, the trial court must first determine whether the proposed change would modify the established custodial environment of that child. . . . If the proposed change would modify the established custodial environment of the child, then the burden is on the parent proposing the change to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the change is in the child’s best interests. Under such circumstances, the trial court must consider all the best-interest factors because a case in which the proposed change would modify the custodial environment is essentially a change-of-custody case. On the other hand, if the proposed change would not modify the established custodial environment of the child, the burden is on the parent proposing the change to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the change is in the child’s best interests. [Sabatine, 513 Mich at 286 (quotation marks and citation omitted).]
 
The trial court found that an established custodial environment existed only with Mother but did not consider if Father’s request for joint legal custody would modify the established custodial environment and failed to do so.  The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s ruling. 
 
Bishop v. Taylor, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 21, 2025 (Docket No. 373010), Washtenaw County.

The parties were never married or cohabitated and have two children, both of whom have lived with Mother since birth. The Washtenaw County prosecutor initiated child support proceedings for the first child, JMBT, resulting in the trial court establishing Father’s parentage, ordering child support, awarding joint legal custody, and granting Father non-overnight parenting time three days a week.

Approximately 10 months later, their second child, JMB, was born. The prosecutor again initiated child support proceedings, and the trial court entered a default judgment establishing Father’s parentage, ordering child support, and awarding Mother sole legal and physical custody of JMB. A notice of contempt was issued against Father for failing to pay child support for JMB.

Father then moved to establish paternity of JMB and sought joint legal and physical custody of both children, alleging a change in circumstances—specifically, being denied parenting time and overnights. In response, Mother moved to modify JMBT’s custody to sole legal custody, citing Father’s delegation of parental responsibilities.

The case was referred to a Friend of the Court (FOC) referee, and the parties temporarily agreed on parenting time and communication via the AppClose platform. The FOC referee found Mother favored in five best-interest factors and the parties equal in the remaining five. The referee recommended sole custody to Mother, parenting time to Father every Sunday, a set holiday schedule, and continued use of AppClose.

Both parties filed objections—Father disputing the referee's findings and seeking joint custody, and Mother objecting to the holiday schedule, noting that Father did not observe holidays. The parties reached a parenting time agreement, and the trial court held an evidentiary hearing.
Following the hearing, the court awarded Mother sole legal custody of both children. Father appealed.

On appeal, Father challenged the trial court’s best interest findings. 

Factor (c) is the “capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and permitted under the laws of this state in place of medical care, and other material needs.” MCL 222.23(c).

The trial court found that Mother was primarily charged with providing the minor children with their necessaries, while Father had a substantial child support arrearage.  The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court’s finding was supported by the record. 

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling. 

Giordana v. Giordana, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 27, 2025 (Docket No. 370808, 372323), Marquette County.

The parties divorced in 2017 and initially shared joint physical and legal custody of their three children. In 2022, Mother unilaterally stopped Father’s parenting time, withdrew the children from school, and began homeschooling them to prevent Father from seeing them. Despite the custody order remaining unchanged, Father had no contact with the children for nearly two years. Mother accused the father of abuse, but multiple CPS and criminal investigations found no evidence to support her claims.

Father filed a motion for civil contempt, makeup parenting time, and a change in custody due to changed circumstances. Mother responded by requesting sole custody and sought a court-ordered medical exam of Father, alleging his genetic markers for Huntington’s disease affected his parenting. However, after testimony from two neurologists and Father’s primary care physician, the court found an exam was unwarranted because he showed no symptoms.

At a custody hearing, the court heard extensive testimony and found that Mother lacked credibility and had intentionally alienated the children from the father. The court ruled that the children should return to public school and gradually resume parenting time with Father. It awarded Mother primary physical custody but gave Father sole legal custody due to Mother’s past behavior. Mother appealed both the denial of the medical exam and the custody order.

MCR 2.311 dictates when a trial court may order a medical or other type of examination, as requested here by defendant-mother. MCR 2.311 states, in part:
 
(A) Order for Examination. When the mental or physical condition (including the blood group) of a party, or of a person in the custody or under the legal control of a party, is in controversy, the court in which the action is pending may order the party to submit to a physical or mental or blood examination by a physician (or other appropriate professional) or to produce for examination the person in the party’s custody or legal control. The order may be entered only on motion for good cause with notice to the person to be examined and to all parties. The order must specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination and the person or persons by whom it is to be made. . . . 

The Court of Appeals rejected Mother’s claim that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to order a medical test.  Expert testimony had revealed that Father had yet to display any physical symptoms of Huntington’s disease. 
 
The Court further rejected Mother’s argument that the trial court erred in awarding Father sole legal custody.
 
The court was also faced with the problem of defendant-mother having interfered with plaintiff-father’s ability to act as a parent for two years. It was reasonable, therefore, for the court to conclude that joint legal custody was not feasible and that plaintiff-father should be the one to retain legal custody so he could make decisions on the children’s schooling, medical care, and religious education.
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order(s). 
  
Hutson v. Arndt, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 29, 2025 (Docket No. 372381), Kent County.

Plaintiff and EH, the incapacitated mother of two minor children, married in April 2014, but their marriage was annulled five months later because EH was a minor. The children were born after the annulment. Plaintiff did not sign affidavits of parentage but was listed on both birth certificates. Genetic testing later confirmed his biological paternity.

In July 2019, EH was seriously injured in a car accident and fell into a coma. At the time, she and the children were living with her mother (defendant), who was appointed temporary guardian of EH. Plaintiff then filed a paternity action, and the children were temporarily placed with defendant, who also sought custody and support. The court adjudicated plaintiff as the children’s legal and biological father and ordered supervised parenting time for him while custody remained with defendant.

Plaintiff argued that as a natural parent, he was entitled to custody unless the defendant (a third party) proved by clear and convincing evidence that custody with him was not in the children’s best interests. After a six-day evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that defendant had established an established custodial environment and that awarding her sole legal and physical custody was in the children’s best interests. Plaintiff’s parenting time remained supervised under a structured schedule.

In April 2023, plaintiff moved for joint legal and physical custody, asserting that he had met the threshold for a change. The trial court determined that the parental presumption applied and that a best-interest hearing was warranted. Following a new evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded that the best-interest factors did not require sole custody with defendant and awarded plaintiff joint custody and unsupervised overnight parenting time every other weekend.

Defendant moved for reconsideration, claiming she was entitled to parental preference as EH’s guardian and arguing errors in the best-interest findings. The trial court denied the motion, and defendant appealed.

“In a dispute between a parent and a third person, the CCA creates a statutory presumption that the best interests of the child[ren] are served by awarding custody to the parent or parents . . . .”  MCL 722.25(1).  The Court of Appeals rejected Defendant’s claim that the parental presumption doctrine did not apply because she was the guardian for EH.  “Given defendant’s status as a third- party custodian and EH’s incapacity to exercise custody of the children herself, the trial court’s application of the parental-presumption doctrine to plaintiff’s request for change in custody did not constitute clear legal error.”

While the Court of Appeals rejected Defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in applying the parental presumption doctrine, the Court did agree that it was erroneous for the trial court to hold that Defendant had to be favored on every single best interest factor in order to prevail. 

Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court have ruled that the language in Heltzel requires the third party to prevail clearly and convincingly on each and every one of the 12 best-interest factors in order to be awarded custody. See Hunter, 484 Mich at 279; Varran v Granneman, 312 Mich App 591, 613; 880 NW2d 242 (2015).

The Court of Appeals vacated the order and remanded the matter back to the trial court. 

Cowell v. Mott, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 29, 2025 (Docket No. 372919), Van Buren County.

This custody dispute began in 2011. In 2012, the trial court awarded Mother sole physical custody of the child, LM, with joint legal custody and parenting time to Father. After Mother moved to Florida in 2015, the custody and parenting arrangements were modified several times. In 2018, Father was awarded sole physical and legal custody. In 2020, the parties agreed to share joint legal custody, with Mother receiving parenting time in Florida. This parenting time was expanded in 2022 by stipulation.

In February 2024, Mother sought to modify custody, requesting primary physical custody and limiting Father’s parenting time to school breaks and holidays. Mother cited several alleged changes in circumstances, including LM’s declining academic performance, disciplinary problems, Father’s inadequate management of LM’s ADHD, poor communication between the parties, Father’s alleged noncompliance with joint legal custody requirements, and suspected drug use.

After a five-day evidentiary hearing with six witnesses, including LM, the Friend of the Court referee recommended denying the motion, finding Mother failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that proper cause or a change of circumstances existed. Mother did not object to the recommendation, and the trial court adopted the findings and denied the motion. Mother appealed.

Since Mother did not file objections to the referee’s recommendation error, her claim was unpreserved. 

Four elements must be established to show that a plain error occurred, and reversal is warranted:

1) Error must have occurred,
2) The error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious,
3) The plain error affected substantial rights, and
4) Once a defendant satisfies these three requirements, an appellate court must exercise its discretion in deciding whether to reverse. Reversal is warranted when the plain, forfeited error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Quint v Quint, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 368002); slip op at 7.

The Court of Appeals found that the trial court erred by applying the incorrect burden of proof. The referee, in evaluating each of the allegations raised by Mother, concluded that there was no change in circumstances and/or proper cause because modifying custody would not remedy the alleged issues. For example, the allegation that Father was not properly administering the minor child’s ADHD medication directly impacted the child’s well-being.
 
The trial court’s order was reversed, and the matter was remanded back to the trial court. 
 
Franklin v. Kohler, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued June 20, 2025 (Docket No. 373502), Grand Traverse County.

The parties, who were never married, are the biological parents of SF, born in May 2016. After their relationship ended early in the pregnancy, they initially shared joint legal custody, with Mother having primary physical custody and parenting time by agreement. They co-parented effectively in Traverse City for several years.

In August 2021, following Mother’s conviction for child endangerment related to substance abuse, the parties entered into a mediated agreement granting Father primary physical custody, with Mother’s parenting time gradually increasing through a four-phase plan contingent on her sobriety. Mother completed all phases and remained sober since 2020.
In September 2023, Mother moved to modify custody, seeking equal physical custody and parenting time. She cited her sustained sobriety, counseling, and participation in recovery programs. In January 2024, shortly before the custody hearing, Father moved to change SF’s domicile to South Carolina, where he had accepted a higher-paying job.

At a multi-day evidentiary hearing, both parties presented testimony and evidence. The family court referee found SF had an established custodial environment with both parents, and that Mother’s proposed custody change would not disrupt that environment. Applying the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, the referee found that equal physical custody was in SF’s best interests. The referee also concluded that Father failed to prove the move to South Carolina was in SF’s best interests under the change-of-domicile statute. Mother’s motion to modify custody was granted, and Father’s motion to change domicile was denied. The referee ordered the parties to mediate a parenting-time schedule due to insufficient evidence on that issue.

Father objected, arguing that the custody change should require clear and convincing evidence and challenged various findings. After a de novo hearing, the trial court affirmed nearly all of the referee’s findings, with a minor exception under best-interests factor (e), and implemented a new parenting-time schedule giving Father summer, winter, spring, and alternating Thanksgiving time. Father appealed.

The Court of Appeals rejected Father’s argument that the trial court applied the incorrect standard.  The evidence demonstrated that, from the perspective of the minor child, the child turned to both parents for love, guidance, discipline, and the necessities of life, and that since the child had an established custodial environment with both parents, Mother’s request to modify custody would not impact the established custodial environment and correctly applied the preponderance of the evidence standard.  The Court of Appeals further affirmed the trial court’s best interest findings. 
 
Affirmed.
 
Gupton v. Gupton, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued June 20, 2025 (Docket No. 367426), Wayne County.

Father filed for divorce in May 2022, alleging that he and Mother married in 2011 and had three minor children: ZG, KG, and LNG. He claimed prior attempts to file for divorce in 2020 and 2021 were unsuccessful due to issues with service. Father also alleged that Mother had an affair resulting in the birth of a nonmarital child, ICT, in November 2020, and that he left the marital home in June 2020 due to her infidelity. Father further alleged that Mother was under investigation by CPS for leaving the children unsupervised. He sought divorce, equitable distribution of assets and debts, and sole legal and primary physical custody of the children.
Mother filed an answer and counterclaim, generally denying the allegations and requesting joint legal and physical custody. After a series of procedural events, including an attempted attorney withdrawal, Father filed an amended complaint reiterating his claims.
In February 2023, a referee recommended temporary sole legal and physical custody for Father, citing concerns about Mother’s parenting, including past CPS investigations, school neglect, physical discipline, and unfounded abuse allegations against Father. The referee found no credible evidence of abuse and noted multiple agency investigations had cleared Father. The trial court adopted the referee’s recommendation and granted Mother supervised parenting time on alternate weekends.

A four-day evidentiary hearing followed in April and May 2023. On the third day, Mother dismissed her attorney and represented herself for the remainder of the proceedings. After closing arguments and further hearings, the trial court found the best-interest factors under MCL 722.23 favored Father and awarded him sole legal and physical custody in the July 31, 2023, judgment of divorce. Mother appealed.

On appeal, Mother alleged that she was deprived of her right to counsel. The Court of Appeals reviewed the factual history of Mother’s request to discharge her attorney, which was based on her claim that he failed to present evidence she wanted introduced. Mother proceeded in propria persona for the remainder of that hearing date and appeared at the next hearing without counsel. The Court of Appeals concluded that Mother had deprived herself of the right to counsel and, therefore, was not prejudiced by her own conduct.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling. 

Wieland v. Swisher, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued July 8, 2025 (Docket No. 372010), Kalkaska County.
 
Following the birth of JCS, the parties had a volatile, on-again-off-again relationship marked by frequent conflict, some of which JCS witnessed. They eventually entered into a consent judgment granting joint legal custody and equal parenting time.

After the judgment, Mother repeatedly violated the agreement by intentionally excluding Father from JCS’s life. She took JCS to California multiple times without consent and made numerous unsubstantiated allegations of physical and sexual abuse against Father involving both herself and JCS.

JCS was subjected to several forensic and in-camera interviews. Investigators and the trial court concluded that Mother was coaching JCS to make false statements to alienate her from Father. Although JCS expressed fear of Father and a desire to stay with Mother, the court found this to be a reflection of Mother’s influence rather than JCS’s independent wishes.
Mother argued that the trial court erred in finding that the minor child had an established custodial environment with both parties. However, the Court of Appeals rejected this argument, noting that the trial court had properly applied the higher clear and convincing evidence standard.

Mother also challenged the trial court’s best-interest findings, specifically contesting the court’s conclusion that Factor (c) favored Father. She argued that reliance on others for assistance in providing for the minor child should not weigh against her. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s finding, reasoning that Father’s consistent history as the primary wage earner supported his present and future ability to provide for the child’s needs.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order. 

Debono v. Cummins., unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued July 16, 2025 (Docket No. 371585), Oakland County.
 
Mother and Father had a minor child out of wedlock. Prior to the child’s birth, the parties’ relationship began to deteriorate. Mother ceased communication with Father before the child was born, and Father’s name was omitted from the birth certificate. Following the birth, Father filed a paternity action.

At trial, Mother testified that Father emotionally abused her during the pregnancy. This testimony was supported by:

• Video footage showing Father being dismissive toward Mother, and
  
• Expert testimony from Dr. Richard Wooten, who explained how such behavior could negatively impact a child.

The trial court found that the minor child had an established custodial environment with Mother only. After analyzing the statutory best-interest factors, the court awarded Mother sole legal and physical custody, with Father receiving expanded parenting time. Father was also ordered to pay child support (retroactive to the child’s birth) and attorney fees.

On appeal, Father argued that the trial court erred in its best-interest analysis, specifically asserting that Factor (b) should have been weighed equally. The Court of Appeals rejected this claim, noting that Father’s emotional abuse of Mother negatively affected the child and would hinder the child’s ability to learn cooperation and collaboration. The Court further affirmed the trial court’s finding that the parties could not effectively communicate or co-parent, making joint legal custody contrary to the child’s best interests.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s custody order.
 
Parenting Time
 
Kleinfeldt v. Stern, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued June 5, 2025 (Docket No. 369562; 369563; 369634; 369931; 371752), Oakland County.

This complex custody dispute between unmarried parents has an extensive trial and appellate history. The trial court issued an initial custody order on March 10, 2023, which was appealed by Mother, leading to multiple appellate decisions (Kleinfeldt I–III) addressing custody, parenting time, jurisdiction, child support, and attorney fees. During the pendency of the appeal, parenting time provisions were stayed, prompting disagreements over interim arrangements and resulting in numerous motions from both parties.

In spring and summer 2023, Father sought parenting time, while Mother filed for attorney fees and sanctions. A trial court order granted Father limited summer parenting time. In August, the court ordered both parties to communicate healthcare information via Our Family Wizard, following ASK’s autism diagnosis confirmed during a Michigan visit.

After ASK returned to Florida in August 2023 with signs of physical injury, Mother took him to the ER. Doctors initially suspected abuse, but a forensic exam by Florida’s Child Protection Team (CPT) found no signs of abuse. CPS and police investigations closed without charges. Nevertheless, Mother sought to suspend Father’s parenting time. An ex parte order granted temporary suspension, which Father challenged as procedurally improper and frivolous.

A two-day evidentiary hearing in fall 2023 included testimony from medical experts, investigators, and both parties. The court ultimately ruled that Mother failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that ASK would be harmed by Father’s parenting time, rescinded the suspension, and denied sanctions against either party.

Additional conflicts arose in late 2023 when Father failed to return ASK after holiday parenting time. Mother filed emergency motions, leading to an in-person hearing in January 2024. The court ordered ASK’s return and scheduled a show-cause hearing. Father then sought a psychological evaluation of Mother for suspected medical child abuse and makeup parenting time.

In a detailed January 26, 2024, opinion, the court found an established custodial environment with Mother and adjusted parenting time to 182.5 overnights annually, including monthly visits to Michigan and makeup time for previously suspended visits. Both parties were ordered to undergo psychological evaluations, and a guardian ad litem was appointed. A $1,500 surety bond requirement was imposed for all future motions, given the 41 motions filed in under a year.

In May 2024, the court found Father in civil contempt for failing to return ASK, failing to disclose caregiver information, and failing to notify Mother of a healthcare appointment. Appeals followed.

The law-of-the-case doctrine is a judicially created doctrine designed to promote consistency throughout the case. Rott v Rott, 508 Mich 274, 286; 972 NW2d 789 (2021). “[I]f an appellate court has passed on a legal question and remanded the case for further proceedings, the legal questions thus determined by the appellate court will not be differently determined on a subsequent appeal in the same case where the facts remain materially the same.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
 
The Court of Appeals has previously ruled in this matter that requiring the minor child to bear the burden of travel for parenting time is an abuse of discretion.  The minor child is young and has special needs, and it is not in his best interests to be required to travel to Michigan from Florida to exercise parenting time with Father. 
 
The parenting time orders were vacated, and the matter was remanded to the trial court to consider a parenting time schedule that does not impose a burden of travel upon the minor child. 
 
Child Support
 
Bruski v.Moja, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 23, 2025 (Docket No. 368916), Presque Isle County.

The parties divorced in 2010 and were awarded joint legal and physical custody of their two minor children, JB and AB. Plaintiff-father was self-employed and initially ordered to pay only $30 per month in child support based on self-reported income. In 2014, defendant-mother moved to set aside the consent judgment, alleging plaintiff misrepresented income and other matters, resulting in inadequate child support. She claimed they had agreed to an informal, under-the-table support arrangement, which she ended after a year due to legal concerns.
The trial court denied the motion to set aside the judgment but referred the child support issue to the Friend of the Court (FOC). The FOC recommended increasing support to $238/month as of August 29, 2014. Mother objected, asserting underreported income. After discovery disputes and procedural delays, the court reiterated in 2015 that Mother would need to file a motion to modify support.

In 2022, Mother moved to increase support, and the FOC recommended $538/month for AB (JB was over 18). Mother argued that support should be retroactive to 2014 and that plaintiff’s company’s retained earnings should be included in his income. Both parties presented expert testimony. Mother’s expert claimed the business retained excess earnings, while Father’s expert justified the cash reserves as necessary working capital and loan capital for business operations.

The trial court ultimately adopted the FOC's 2022 recommendation retroactive only to February 2022. It held that earlier orders were final and that retroactive modification under MCL 552.603(2) was barred because Father had not been properly notified until 2022. It also found no evidence of intentional income misrepresentation under MCL 552.603b. The court concluded that the corporation’s retained earnings were reasonable and business-related.
Mother appealed.

MCL 552.603(2) allows for retroactive modification of child support obligations “with respect to a period during which there is pending a petition for modification, but only from the date that notice of the petition was given to the payer or recipient of support.” Additionally, temporary support orders entered under MCR 3.207(C) may be retroactively modified. MCL 552.603(3); Proudfit v O’Neal, 193 Mich App 608, 611; 484 NW2d 746 (1992). And the parties may agree to retroactive modification. MCL 552.603(5). This Court has refused to allow retroactive modification of support orders, except as provided in MCL 552.603. Malone v Malone, 279 Mich App 280, 288-289; 761 NW2d 102 (2008).

Mother argued that the 2014 USO was temporary, and therefore subject to modification.  The Court of Appeals rejected this argument.  “MCR 3.207(C)(4) requires that ‘[a] temporary order must state its effective date and whether its provisions may be modified retroactively by a subsequent order.’”  The 2014 USO was not labeled as a “temporary” order but was instead identified as a “Modified” child support order.  That order did not provide that it was subject to retroactive modification. 

Mother further argued that the trial court erred by not treating held income as undistributed profits attributed to Father’s income. 

2021 MCSF 2.01(E)(4)(d) addresses reduced or deferred income as follows:

Because a parent’s compensation can be rearranged to hide income, determine whether unnecessary reductions in salaries, fees, or distributed profits have occurred by comparing amounts and rates to historical patterns.

(i)  Unless the business can demonstrate legitimate reasons for a substantial reduction in the percentage of distributed profits, use a three-year average to determine the amount to include as a parent’s income.
(ii)  Unless a business can demonstrate legitimate reasons for reductions (as a percentage of gross business income) in salaries, bonuses, management fees, or other amounts paid to a parent, use a three-year average to determine the amount to include as a parent’s income.

Mother’s expert testified that only $12,500 of retained earnings was necessary as operating capital but could not explain how that figure was calculated beyond the fact that it was told to her by another member of her accounting firm.   Father’s expert provided detailed analysis of the business expenses, Father’s income, and opined that the $12,500 was sufficient for only one (1) month of operating costs. 

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling. 

Debono v. Cummins., unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued July 16, 2025 (Docket No. 371585), Oakland County.

Mother and Father had a minor child out of wedlock. Prior to the child’s birth, the parties’ relationship began to deteriorate. Mother ceased communication with Father before the child was born, and Father’s name was omitted from the birth certificate. Following the birth, Father filed a paternity action.

At trial, Mother testified that Father emotionally abused her during the pregnancy. This testimony was supported by:

• Video footage showing Father being dismissive toward Mother, and
  
• Expert testimony from Dr. Richard Wooten, who explained how such behavior could negatively impact a child.

​
The trial court found that the minor child had an established custodial environment with Mother only. After analyzing the statutory best-interest factors, the court awarded Mother sole legal and physical custody, with Father receiving expanded parenting time.  The matter of child support was referred to the Friend of the Court referee where Father alleged he was unemployed.  Father was imputed income of $80,000.00. 

On appeal, Father argued that the trial court failed to properly apply the Michigan Child Support Formula (MCSF). 

“[T]he [trial] court shall order child support in an amount determined by application of the child support formula developed by the state friend of the court bureau as required in section 19 of the friend of the court act, MCL 552.519.” MCL 552.605(2). “Just as with a statute, courts must comply with the plain language of the MCSF, and may not read language into the MCSF that is not present.” Clarke v Clarke, 297 Mich App 172, 179; 823 NW2d 318 (2012). “A trial court must strictly comply with the requirements of the MCSF in calculating the parents’ support obligations unless it ‘determines from the facts of the case that application of the child support formula would be unjust or inappropriate. . . .’ ” Borowsky v Borowsky, 273 Mich App 666, 673; 733 NW2d 71 (2007), quoting MCL 552.605(2).

Where income varies considerably year-to-year due to the nature of the parent’s work, [trial courts] use three years’ information to determine that parents’ income. 2021 MCSF 2.02(B).
In this case, the trial court failed to use three years of information to determine the income for Father.   Father testified that, in prior years, he did not earn what he did in 2023, but the trial court failed to consider the previous years in arriving at an income for purposes of calculating child support. 

The Court further found that it was in error for the trial court to impute income to Father without considering all of the imputation factors pursuant to MCSF  2.01(G)(2).   The trial court also did not make a finding that Father was either "voluntarily unemployed, underemployed, or had an unexercised ability to earn."

The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s child support order and imputation determination. 
 
Procedural
 
Dandan v. Dandan, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 23, 2025 (Docket No. 364860), Isabella County.

Wife, a U.S. citizen, met Husband, an Arab immigrant from Israel, in May 2015 and quickly developed a romantic relationship. They had an Islamic wedding in July 2015, and Wife integrated Husband into her financial and personal affairs. In 2016, they began the process of obtaining a green card for Husband, which involved Wife sponsoring him through a signed I-864 Affidavit of Support. After a successful USCIS interview in 2018, Husband received his permanent green card.

Following this, Wife claimed the Husband’s behavior drastically changed—he allegedly admitted to marrying her solely to obtain residency, became verbally abusive, and was unfaithful. She argued this showed the marriage was fraudulent. Husband denied these claims and attributed the marital breakdown to mutual conflict.

The trial court found both parties at fault, denied any finding of fraud, and granted a divorce without spousal support, dividing property and debts equally. The court noted that while Wife seemed to seek an annulment, she had not formally requested one. On appeal, Wife argued the court erred in not finding fraud.

The Court of Appeals rejected Wife’s claims that the trial court erred in not finding fraud.  Wife also argued that she should not be obligated to continue to provide to support to Husband pursuant to the I-864 Affidavit of Support. 
 
Because federal law prohibits the entry of immigrants who are likely to become dependent on public benefits, the federal government requires a sponsor to sign an affidavit, in which the sponsor agrees to provide financial support in accordance with USC 1183a(a)(1)(A). Mao v Bright, 645 F Supp 3d 805, 809 (SD Ohio, Dec 9, 2022)
 
“The I-864 Affidavit of Support specifically states that divorce does not terminate the sponsor’s financial obligation.” Id.
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling that Wife did not demonstrate a circumstance under which the I-864 affidavit would be set aside.   The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. 
 
Kleinfeldt v. Stern, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued June 5, 2025 (Docket No. 369562; 369563; 369634; 369931; 371752), Oakland County.

This complex custody dispute between unmarried parents has an extensive trial and appellate history. The trial court issued an initial custody order on March 10, 2023, which was appealed by Mother, leading to multiple appellate decisions (Kleinfeldt I–III) addressing custody, parenting time, jurisdiction, child support, and attorney fees. During the pendency of the appeal, parenting time provisions were stayed, prompting disagreements over interim arrangements and resulting in numerous motions from both parties.

In spring and summer 2023, Father sought parenting time, while Mother filed for attorney fees and sanctions. A trial court order granted Father limited summer parenting time. In August, the court ordered both parties to communicate healthcare information via Our Family Wizard, following ASK’s autism diagnosis confirmed during a Michigan visit.

After ASK returned to Florida in August 2023 with signs of physical injury, Mother took him to the ER. Doctors initially suspected abuse, but a forensic exam by Florida’s Child Protection Team (CPT) found no signs of abuse. CPS and police investigations closed without charges. Nevertheless, Mother sought to suspend Father’s parenting time. An ex parte order granted temporary suspension, which Father challenged as procedurally improper and frivolous.

A two-day evidentiary hearing in fall 2023 included testimony from medical experts, investigators, and both parties. The court ultimately ruled that Mother failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that ASK would be harmed by Father’s parenting time, rescinded the suspension, and denied sanctions against either party.

Additional conflicts arose in late 2023 when Father failed to return ASK after holiday parenting time. Mother filed emergency motions, leading to an in-person hearing in January 2024. The court ordered ASK’s return and scheduled a show-cause hearing. Father then sought a psychological evaluation of Mother for suspected medical child abuse and makeup parenting time.

In a detailed January 26, 2024, opinion, the court found an established custodial environment with Mother and adjusted parenting time to 182.5 overnights annually, including monthly visits to Michigan and makeup time for previously suspended visits. Both parties were ordered to undergo psychological evaluations, and a guardian ad litem was appointed. A $1,500 surety bond requirement was imposed for all future motions, given the 41 motions filed in under a year.

In May 2024, the court found Father in civil contempt for failing to return ASK, failing to disclose caregiver information, and failing to notify Mother of a healthcare appointment. Appeals followed.

Mother argued on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by limiting witness testimony. 
 
A trial court generally has wide discretion and power in terms of trial conduct, but that discretion is not unlimited. Paquette, 214 Mich App at 340. At the time of the evidentiary hearing, MRE 611(a) provided:
 
The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment. [MRE 611, as amended August 25, 2009, 485 Mich cccix (2012).]
 
The Court has previously allowed a trial court to limit the length of time a witness has to testify provided that it is fair to both sides and that each party has had an opportunity to fully question the witnesses.  In this case, Mother failed to identify how she was prejudiced by the trial court’s limits on witness testimony. 
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s evidentiary hearing limits. 
 
Both parties in this matter appealed the trial court’s imposition of a $1,500 surety bond as a condition precedent to filing new motions given that the parties have filed a combined 41 motions in this relatively young case. 
 
A trial court may require a party to post a bond as security for costs on its own motion. Zapalski v Benton, 178 Mich App 398, 404; 444 NW2d 171 (1989).22 MCR 2.109(A) provides, in relevant part:
 
On motion of a party against whom a claim has been asserted in a civil action, if it appears reasonable and proper, the court may order the opposing party to file with the court clerk a bond with surety as required by the court in an amount sufficient to cover all costs and other recoverable expenses that may be awarded by the trial court, or, if the claiming party appeals, by the trial and appellate courts. The court shall determine the amount in its discretion.
 
In this case, neither party demonstrated that the bond was burdensome or unreasonably prevented either party from accessing the court.  The trial court also noted that the parties’ matter was highly litigious.  
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling imposing a surety bond prior to the filing of motions. 
 
Michalak v. Michalak., unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued July 8, 2025 (Docket No. 369110), Midland County.
 
This case involves the computation of time for filing an appeal following a Friend of the Court recommendation.  The recommendation was sent to the parties on June 16, 2023.  Mother faxed her objections to the court on July 11, 2023.  At a hearing on August 11, 2023, the trial court ruled that Mother’s objections were untimely and dismissed her objections. 
 
MCL 552.507(4) requires a trial court to hold a de novo hearing on a matter that was heard by a referee if a party objects to the referee’s recommendation “within 21 days after the recommendation is made available to that party.”
 
MCR 3.215(E)(1)(c) states that if the court approves the referee’s recommendation, a party’s objection to the approved recommendation must be “filed with the court clerk within 21 days after service.” MCR 3.203 governs service in domestic relations cases, and Subsection (A)(2) states that court documents “must be served as provided in MCR 2.107” unless otherwise specified.
 
MCR 2.107(C)(3) states, “Service by mail is complete at the time of mailing.”
 
The Friend of the Court recommendation was mailed on June 16, 2023.  Mother’s objections were due by July 7, 2025.

 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling. 
 
Clark v. Clark., unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued July 14, 2025 (Docket No. 366151; 367121), Oakland County.

These consolidated appeals arise from contentious divorce proceedings between the parties, culminating in a judgment of divorce entered on April 6, 2023. The parties married in 2005 and had three children: KC (13), MC (10), and JC (8). During the marriage, Father worked as a bankruptcy and foreclosure attorney, while Mother was a stay-at-home mother who later returned to work as a contract speech and language pathologist.

Financial disputes dominated the proceedings. Early in the case, the trial court entered an ex parte order requiring both parties to maintain the financial status quo. After extensive litigation, including a 12-day evidentiary hearing and bench trial, the trial court ordered Father to pay $1,430 per month in child support and $3,300 per month in spousal support for 90 months. Father was also ordered to pay $1,390 per month toward arrears totaling $34,314 from unpaid status quo obligations, in addition to a lump-sum spousal support award of $71,436.33.

Due to concerns about Father’s behavior, the court ordered him to enroll in an anger management program and to provide written proof of participation. When Father reported difficulty enrolling in other programs due to cost and availability, the court referred him to a court-approved course.

Before finalizing the divorce judgment, the court imposed a $1,000 bond requirement for each future motion or pleading filed by Father, citing a pattern of duplicative, frivolous, and harassing filings intended to delay proceedings. After the judgment, Father sought to waive the bond and modify child and spousal support based on alleged financial hardship. The trial court denied his request, finding no material change in financial circumstances and reaffirming the bond requirement due to his past litigation conduct. Father appealed.

Father first appealed the trial court’s imposition of a $1,000 bond in order to petition to modify child support and spousal support.  The Court of Appeals examined the trial court recorded and concluded that the trial court correctly found that Father did not present a change in circumstance or proper cause to consider a modification of either child support or spousal support.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling. 

The Court also rejected Father’s argument that he was improperly placed in the Step Forward anger management program since he did not qualify for the parameters of that program.   While he may not have had a felony conviction, the trial court only ordered him to Step Forward after he testified that he was unable to enroll in any other anger management program.

Affirmed.

Alexander v. Alexander, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued July 18, 2025 (Docket No. 371900), Gladwin County.

Husband and Wife entered into a Judgment of Separate Maintenance in 2017. The Separate Maintenance Agreement (“SMA”) was final and binding and required Husband to pay Wife $2,805 per month in spousal support, plus cost-of-living increases. Spousal support would terminate only upon Wife’s remarriage or the death of either party and was otherwise non-modifiable.

In April 2022, Husband filed for divorce and sought a new spousal support order. Wife requested that the spousal support provisions from the SMA be incorporated into the divorce judgment. Following a bench trial, the court granted the divorce and incorporated the SMA’s terms, including the spousal support award. Wife’s support was increased to $3,323 per month to reflect the agreed-upon cost-of-living adjustment.

On appeal, Husband argued that the trial court erred by not applying MCL 552.23(1), which provides:

Upon entry of a judgment of divorce or separate maintenance, if the estate and effects awarded to either party are insufficient for the suitable support and maintenance of either party and any children of the marriage who are committed to the care and custody of either party, the court may also award to either party the part of the real and personal estate of either party and spousal support out of the real and personal estate, to be paid to either party in gross or otherwise as the court considers just and reasonable, after considering the ability of either party to pay and the character and situation of the parties, and all the other circumstances of the case.

The Court of Appeals, however, reaffirmed that “another ‘bedrock principle’ of Michigan jurisprudence is that ‘the fundamental right to contract must be protected by allowing parties to contract freely and by enforcing contractual agreements.’” Allard v Allard (On Remand), 318 Mich App 583, 596; 899 NW2d 420 (2017).
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The Court rejected Husband’s argument that the trial court was required to reassess spousal support, holding that those matters had been resolved in the SMA and expressly contracted to be non-modifiable. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling.