DOMESTIC CASELAW UPDATE

BY RYAN M. O’NEIL (OAKLAND)

Custody
 
Hamilton v Kronback, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued January 15, 2026 (Docket No. 374950) Livingston County
 
After an initial child-support action, the trial court ordered joint legal custody and granted the defendant parenting time, including three weekends per month. About two and a half years later, the plaintiff moved to modify custody, parenting time, and child support, alleging proper cause and changed circumstances based on the defendant’s substance-related criminal charges, lack of a driver’s license, alleged unsafe driving with the child, poor co-parenting, and logistical issues.
 
At an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff acknowledged that defendant (or his family) consistently exercised parenting time and that the child continued to attend visits, even when defendant was incarcerated or in treatment. Defendant admitted to criminal convictions but testified to ongoing compliance with sobriety court and treatment, denied endangering the child, and explained that family members assisted during parenting time when necessary. Defendant and his mother testified that the defendant maintained a strong relationship with the child and remained involved in schooling and therapy.
 
The referee questioned whether an established custodial environment existed and recommended mediation. Defendant objected, and the trial court reviewed the record. The court found that an established custodial environment existed with the defendant and that the plaintiff failed to prove proper cause or a change in circumstances sufficient to modify custody, parenting time, or child support. The plaintiff’s motion was denied in full, and—after clarification—the mediation order was rescinded. The plaintiff appealed.
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling.  The Court noted that, while the parties’ co-parenting relationship was far from ideal, the parties were able to co-parent and make decisions together despite the distance between the parties and the issues raised by Plaintiff. 
 
Affirmed.
 ​

Hill v Hill, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued January 16, 2026 (Docket No. 374724) Muskegon County
 
The parties divorced in February 2022 with joint legal and physical custody and alternating weekly parenting time for their three children. Beginning in March 2023, the mother repeatedly sought sole legal custody due to ongoing disputes over decision-making, particularly counseling, medical care, and schooling. The litigation spanned nearly two years and included multiple motions, hearings, counseling orders, contempt findings, and the appointment of a legal guardian ad litem (LGAL).
Throughout the proceedings, the trial court consistently found that the parents were unable to cooperate on essential decisions. The court credited evidence showing that the father repeatedly acted unilaterally—refusing or terminating counseling ordered by the court, making educational decisions without consulting the mother, cancelling medical appointments, and initiating unsubstantiated CPS investigations—often in violation of court orders. The mother, by contrast, supported continued counseling and testified to improvements in the children’s well-being.
 
The LGAL ultimately concluded that the parents could not successfully co-parent without ongoing, disruptive conflict. After a two-day evidentiary hearing in early 2025, the trial court determined that the parties’ inability to agree on major issues of medical care and education met the standard for awarding sole legal custody. Citing the parents’ chronic conflict and the father’s failures to communicate and comply with orders, the court awarded sole legal custody to the mother in February 2025, concluding that doing so was in the children’s best interests. The father appealed.
 
MCL 722.27(1)(c) imposes a gatekeeping function on trial courts, acting as a “barrier against removal of a child from an established custodial environment and to minimize unwarranted and disruptive changes of custody orders.” Vodvarka v Grasmeyer, 259 Mich App 499, 507-508; 675 NW2d 847 (2003). As a threshold matter, a party seeking to change custody must establish proper cause or a change in circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. at 507- 509.
 
If a trial court improperly adjudicates a child-custody dispute, and the impropriety is not harmless, the appropriate remedy is to remand for reevaluation or for a new child-custody hearing. See [Rittershaus, 273 Mich App at 475-476]. On remand, the trial court “must reevaluate the child’s established custodial environment and must also reanalyze the best-interest factors. In resolving both issues, the court should consider all up-to-date information brought to its attention.” Kubicki v Sharpe, 306 Mich App 525, 545; 858 NW2d 57 (2014). [Quint v Quint, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 368002); slip op at 4.]
 
The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court failed to make a threshold finding as to a change in circumstance and/or proper cause, failed to make a finding regarding the minor children’s established custodial environment, and failed to make any best interest findings.  The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s order and remanded the matter back to the trial court. 
 
Plachta v Plachta, ___ Mich App ___ ; ___ NW3d ___ (2026) (Docket No. 374260) Genesee County
 
Plaintiff appealed the trial court’s order granting defendant sole legal custody of the parties’ youngest child, AP. Plaintiff argued that the trial court committed legal error by failing to determine whether the custody change altered AP’s established custodial environment and by not clearly stating what burden of proof applied.
 
The parties’ divorce judgment originally awarded joint legal and physical custody. After years of extensive conflict and repeated custody motions, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing, including an in camera interview of the child. The court found good cause to revisit custody, determined that AP had an established custodial environment with both parents, evaluated the statutory best-interest factors under MCL 722.23, and made findings under MCL 722.26a.
 
Ultimately, the trial court granted defendant sole legal custody while maintaining joint physical custody, reasoning that AP’s special needs and the parents’ inability to jointly make decisions required one parent to have final decision-making authority.
 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that while the trial court did not make a finding as to whether or not modifying legal custody would impact the minor child’s established custodial environment, the findings by the trial court were not in error that the parties could not exercise joint legal custody. 
 
If two equally capable parents whose marriage relationship has irreconcilably broken down are unable to cooperate and to agree generally concerning important decisions affecting the welfare of their children, the court has no alternative but to determine which parent shall have sole custody of the children. The establishment of the right to custody in one parent does not constitute a determination of the unfitness of the noncustodial parent but is rather the result of the court’s considered evaluation of several diverse factors relevant to the best interests of the children.
 
Fisher v Fisher, 118 Mich App 227, 233; 324 NW2d 582 (1982)
 
The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court correctly made that finding in this case that the parties were wholly unable to cooperate with one another when it came to matters that impacted the well-being of their children.  However . . .
 
The failure not to identify the burden of proof is always reversable error.  Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling and remanded the matter back to the trial court to make a finding as to whether or not the modification of legal custody would impact the children’s established custodial environment.  The Court otherwise affirmed the trial court’s best interest findings. 
 
The Court also made a note on opinions that predate November 1, 1990. 
 
All of our published decisions have precedential effect under the rule of stare decisis. MCR 7.215(C)(2). However, published decisions issued after November 1, 1990, that are on point with a particular issue must be followed by this Court without discretion (though we can express our reasons why we would prefer not to and seek a polling of the Court to hold a conflict panel, see MCR 7.215(J)(1)), whereas older published opinions should be followed by this Court unless “important prudential considerations” compel us to do otherwise. 2000 Baum Family Trust v Babel, 488 Mich 136, 180 n 26; 793 NW2d 633 (2010). [In re Guardianship of Bazakis, 342 Mich App 144, 153 n 4; 992 NW2d 673 (2022), vacated in part on other grounds, 513 Mich 1006 (2024)].
 
Under these rules, there is no difference in the precedential effect of a pre- versus post-1990 decision. Instead, the only difference between a pre- and post-November 1, 1990 decision is that the latter must be followed by a subsequent panel unless it is overruled by a conflict panel or the Supreme Court, while the former must be followed unless a subsequent three-judge panel concludes it is distinguishable or warrants reversal. MCR 7.215(C)(1) & (2). This is unlike unpublished opinions, which are not required to be followed under any circumstance.
 
Horazdovsky v Horazdovsky, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued March 5, 2026 (Docket No. 376242) Midland County
 
After the parties divorced in 2021, defendant was awarded physical custody of the parties’ three children and plaintiff received parenting time. The children frequently refused parenting time with plaintiff and were experiencing academic and attendance problems, including one child who regularly missed school. The trial court later found that defendant had repeatedly interfered with plaintiff’s parenting time and ordered 126 overnight makeup visits. During that period, the children’s school attendance and grades improved, and their relationship with plaintiff strengthened. In 2024, plaintiff moved for primary physical custody. Following an evidentiary hearing and in camera interviews with the children, the trial court granted plaintiff primary physical custody and awarded defendant parenting time. Defendant appealed the decision.
 
Business-Records Exception
On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred in allowing school attendance records without first hearing testimony from a record’s custodian. 
 
The “business-records exception” to the hearsay rule found in MRE 803(6) allows for the admission of a record compiled and kept in the course of regularly conducted business activity when authenticated by the custodian of the record. MRE 803(6) provides that evidence not excluded by the rule against hearsay includes a record of an act, transaction, occurrence, event, condition, opinion, or diagnoses
if:
 
(A) the record was made at or near the time by – or from information transmitted by – someone with knowledge;
 
(B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of a business, organization, occupation, or calling, whether or not for profit;
 
(C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity;
 
(D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or another qualified witness, or by a certification that complies with a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court or with a statute permitting certification; and
 
(E) the opponent does not show that the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.
 
The Court of Appeals found that although the trial court erred by admitting the records without first having them authenticated by a custodian, the error was harmless because the purpose of admitting the records was to show that the children did not attend school regularly during Plaintiff’s parenting time—not to identify specific dates. The parties had already agreed that the children did not regularly attend school while under Defendant’s care.
 
Lay Testimony
 
Defendant also argued that the trial court erred by allowing Plaintiff to testify as a lay witness about the minor children playing video games at Defendant’s home past 9:00PM because the Plaintiff observed someone using the children’s “game tags” during those times. 
 
Under MRE 602, a lay witness may testify only regarding a matter of which the witness has personal knowledge. MRE 701, however, permits a lay witness to provide opinion testimony if it is “rationally based on the witness’s perception” and is “helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue.” See Airgas Specialty Products v Michigan Occupation Safety and Health Administration, 338 Mich App 482, 516; 980 NW2d 530 (2021) (referring to the prior version of MRE 701).
 
The Court of Appeals found that Plaintiff’s testimony—that video game tags appearing online after 9:00 p.m. required specialized knowledge—should have been inadmissible under MRE 701. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals concluded that the error was harmless because the trial court gave this testimony minimal weight.
 
Past Events
 
Defendant further argued that the trial court erred by precluding her from testifying about prior incidents of abuse that predated entry of the divorce judgment.
 
[W]ith regard to proper cause, the trial court is not barred from considering evidence that predates the entry of the last custody order. See Vodvarka, 259 Mich App at 514-515.
 
Once again, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court erred by not allowing Defendant to present this testimony. However, the error was deemed harmless because the trial court offered Defendant the opportunity to make a record regarding the excluded evidence, and Defendant chose not to do so.
 
Best Interest Findings
 
Defendant also challenged the trial court’s best-interest findings. Specifically, Mother challenged the findings under Factor (C), which considers “the capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care, or other remedial care.” The trial court found that the minor children were allergic to cats and that Mother’s possession of ten (10) cats was detrimental to their health.
 
The problem, however, was that there was no evidence that the children were allergic to cats—none. Defendant testified that she had been told by a doctor that the children were not allergic to cats, and Plaintiff did not produce any evidence rebutting this testimony.
 
Defendant also argued that the trial court failed to consider Plaintiff’s acts of domestic violence pursuant to MCL 722.23(k). The Court of Appeals agreed that the trial court erred in failing to consider evidence of prior abuse. However, the trial court did consider Defendant’s continued contact with a boyfriend who also “exhibited violence in her home.” Although the trial court erred, the Court of Appeals concluded that the overall best-interest findings still supported modification of the previous custody order.
 
Affirmed. 
 
Grasmeyer v Grasmeyer II, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued March 13, 2026 (Docket No. 375438; 376413) Ottawa County
 
Does the name of this case sound familiar?  Trying to put your finger on it?  That is because the defendant in this case is the son of Ronald Grasmeyer – the defendant in Vodvarka v Grasmeyer, 259 Mich. App. 499, 675 N.W.2d 847 (2003). 
 
This case arises from a prolonged and contentious divorce between the parties. Plaintiff first filed for divorce in Muskegon County in March 2022, but the case was dismissed in March 2023 after the statutory one-year period expired without resolution. After the dismissal, plaintiff moved from the marital home in Muskegon to Hudsonville and filed a new divorce action in Ottawa County in March 2023.
 
The parties had four minor children (RG, TG, KG, and LG) and also cared for defendant’s adult child, JG. In December 2021, defendant suffered a severe case of COVID-19 requiring hospitalization. During that time, plaintiff discovered that defendant had engaged in multiple extramarital affairs, which prompted her to seek divorce. Defendant later admitted to relationships with several women, including family friends.
 
By the time of the Ottawa County proceedings, plaintiff’s relationship with the two oldest children (RG and TG) had deteriorated significantly. Both children frequently ran away from plaintiff’s home and resisted parenting time, and the divorce conflict negatively affected all four children. RG was charged in juvenile court after choking plaintiff during an argument, TG displayed ongoing defiant and confrontational behavior, KG had Smith-Magenis Syndrome and mild cognitive impairment and faced juvenile charges for property destruction, and LG made suicidal and homicidal statements and also began running away during parenting time.
 
After a lengthy bench trial, the court entered a judgment of divorce awarding joint legal custody. The court split physical custody: RG and TG with defendant, and KG and LG with plaintiff. The court also awarded plaintiff attorney fees, leading to the present appeals.
 
On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred in awarding plaintiff custody of KG and LG.  The trial court had found that parties had engaged in conduct to undermine the other parent’s relationship with the minor children including exposing the children to on-going legal disputes, but that plaintiff did more to curb such actions. 
 
Defendant conceded that he made two inappropriate statements regarding plaintiff in the presence of the minor children. Specifically, in March 2023, defendant stated in the presence of TG that plaintiff had engaged in infidelity and had infected defendant with a sexually transmitted disease (STD). Additionally, in February 2024, defendant informed a clinician, in the presence of LG, that plaintiff did not have custody of LG’s older brothers due to plaintiff’s alleged domestic abuse.
 
The Court of Appeals rejected defendant’s argument that the trial court overly emphasized these instances as the trial court issued a 62-page opinion which identified numerous instances of misconduct. 
 
The record establishes that, in addition to attributing plaintiff’s lack of custody of LG’s brother to alleged abuse, defendant also informed LG’s clinician that LG had absconded from plaintiff’s home on seven occasions. Moreover, plaintiff testified that the children repeated statements to her that mirrored statements previously made by defendant, including allegations of infidelity, transmission of an STD, and attempted homicide. Additional evidence demonstrated that defendant blamed plaintiff, in the presence of the children, for delays in the divorce proceedings and for the parties’ failure to reach a settlement.
 
The record further reflects that, despite the degrading, profane, and violent statements and conduct exhibited by RG and TG toward plaintiff, defendant took minimal or no action to intervene or correct such behavior. Defendant permitted TG to follow plaintiff throughout the home during an appraisal, during which TG physically impeded plaintiff, yelled at her, and suggested that she should harm herself, without significant intervention by defendant. Defendant testified that he believed RG was acting in self-defense when he choked plaintiff after she entered RG’s room to recover her belongings
 
The evidence further demonstrated that defendant did not encourage RG or TG to participate in plaintiff’s court-ordered parenting time. Defendant refused to assist plaintiff in arranging transportation for RG and TG following a court order and made little or no effort to facilitate reunification counseling for RG, TG, and plaintiff.
 
Moreover, contrary to defendant’s contention that the trial court erred by considering this conduct under multiple best-interest factors, the law recognizes that certain best-interest factors may overlap, and a single fact or circumstance may properly be considered under more than one factor. Fletcher v Fletcher, 229 Mich App 19, 24-25; 581 NW2d 11 (1998).
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s finding that defendant’s continual disparagement of plaintiff in the presence of the minor children was the primary cause of the deteriorating relationship between the parties’ oldest children and plaintiff.  The Court affirmed the trial court’s custody order. 
 
Parenting Time
 
McClory v McClory, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued January 13, 2026 (Docket No. 372596) Wayne County
 
The parties were married and had two minor children. Plaintiff filed for divorce alleging an irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. Following a divorce trial, defendant was found in default for failing to comply with the trial court’s scheduling order by not filing an exhibit list, witness list, trial brief, or updated financial information. As a result, the trial court limited defendant’s participation at trial to testimony on custody issues and prohibited him from cross-examining plaintiff or her witnesses. The trial court entered a judgment of divorce awarding plaintiff sole physical custody, joint legal custody, and granting defendant supervised parenting time through a parenting-time agency. Defendant appealed.
 
Defendant argued that the trial court erred by failing to award him parenting time based on specific dates and times.   The Court rejected this claim finding that, “Under MCL 722.27(1)(b), the circuit court may ‘[p]rovide for reasonable parenting time of the child by the parties involved . . . by general or specific terms and conditions.’” Defendant was awarded supervised parenting time at a facility.  Defendant never requested that the trial court issue a specific parenting time order. 
 
Affirmed
 
Kahl v Kasten, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued January 15, 2026 (Docket No. 372185) Livingston County

The parties’ consent judgment of divorce granted joint legal custody but did not expressly decide physical custody. Parenting time was limited because the defendant lived with his father; the judgment stated that once the defendant obtained independent housing, parenting time would be reviewed, and the parties agreed that this would constitute “proper cause” or a “change of circumstances” to revisit parenting time.

After the defendant moved out, he sought increased parenting time and support. The plaintiff argued this was effectively a custody change because she had been the children’s primary physical custodian for several years and the children had an established custodial environment with her.

A referee recommended denial of the motion, concluding that (1) parties cannot stipulate to waive the court’s duty to independently determine proper cause or change of circumstances, rendering that provision ineffective; (2) the defendant’s request amounted to a change of custody due to the significant increase in parenting time sought; and (3) the defendant failed to show proper cause or a change of circumstances beyond his change in housing and informal increases in parenting time.

The trial court agreed, holding that a change in residence is a normal life event, that parties cannot stipulate to what constitutes proper cause or a change of circumstances, and that allowing such provisions would create chaos. The court denied the defendant’s objections and motion.

On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred by ruling that parties cannot stipulate to events constituting a change of circumstances.

[W]hile parties are encouraged to work with each other to settle custody and parenting-time issues, they cannot through stipulation or agreement deprive the trial court of its statutorily-mandated duty to determine the best interests of a child. See Harvey v Harvey, 470 Mich 186, 192-194; 680 NW2d 835 (2004); Stoudemire v Thomas, 344 Mich App 34, 47; 999 NW2d 43 (2022); and Phillips v Jordan, 241 Mich App 17, 21; 614 NW2d 183 (2000).

“[T]he deference due [to] parties’ negotiated agreements does not diminish the court’s obligation to examine the best interest factors and make the child’s best interests paramount.” Harvey v Harvey, 470 Mich 186, 193; 680 NW2d 835 (2004). “Permitting the parties, by stipulation, to limit the trial court’s authority to review custody determinations would nullify the protections of the Child Custody Act and relieve the circuit court of its statutorily imposed responsibilities.” Id. at 194

Defendant further argued that the trial court erred in finding that he failed to show a change in circumstance and/or proper cause to modify parenting time.  The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court’s ruling that Defendant’s request was essentially a change in custody.  Plaintiff had primary custody of the parties’ minor children, and Defendant was seeking an equal parenting time schedule.  This modification would alter the children’s established custodial environment.  Accordingly, the trial court correctly applied the higher threshold in Vodvarka and did not error in finding that Defendant’s move did not demonstrate a proper cause and/or change in circumstance. 

Affirmed. 

A concurring opinion found the majority’s analysis to be superfluous as the parties’ judgment provided that a move would be a change in circumstance/proper cause to modify parenting time and Defendant’s request sought a modification of custody.  The concurring opinion would not have analyzed the parties’ judgment – only the request by Defendant to modify custody which was properly denied. 

Change of Domicile
 
Hansen v Schalow, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued January 28, 2026 (Docket No. 373987) Dickinson County
 
This case returned to the Court of Appeals after a prior remand concerning plaintiff Heidi Hansen’s request to change the children’s domicile. Plaintiff originally appealed the trial court’s December 2024 order denying her motion to relocate the children to Wisconsin, challenging the court’s factual findings under the best-interest factors in MCL 722.23.
 
While that appeal was pending, plaintiff filed a new motion to change domicile in April 2025. Rather than decide the original appeal, the Court of Appeals remanded the case for the trial court to rule on the new motion while retaining jurisdiction.
 
On remand, the trial court held a two-day hearing and this time granted plaintiff’s motion. The court found that plaintiff proved the statutory relocation factors under MCL 722.31(4) by a preponderance of the evidence, that an established custodial environment existed with both parents, and that the move would modify that environment. The court further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the best-interest factors overall favored relocation.
 
Specifically, the trial court determined that several best-interest factors favored plaintiff, one favored defendant, and others were neutral. The court entered an order in December 2025 establishing the children’s domicile in both Wisconsin and Michigan, making plaintiff the primary physical custodian while maintaining joint legal custody, with parenting time scheduling to be addressed later if the parties could not agree.
 
The only matter challenged on appeal was the trial court’s best interest findings.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s findings.  Specifically, the Court affirmed the trial court’s findings regarding Factor A: The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the parties involved and the child.  The trial court found that Defendant delayed seeking help for the minor children’s school and medical matters, and that Defendant was motivated to delay these measures in order to give him an advantage over Plaintiff. 
 
Affirmed. 
 
Yongo v Okochi, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued March 11, 2026 (Docket No. 375198) Ottawa County
 
Plaintiff and defendant were married in 2020 and divorced in 2024. The divorce judgment awarded plaintiff primary physical custody of their two minor children, joint legal custody to both parties, and parenting time to defendant. Plaintiff previously appealed the divorce judgment, alleging evidentiary errors, due-process violations, and judicial bias, but the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.
 
In February 2025, plaintiff filed a motion seeking to change the children’s domicile from Michigan to Houston, Texas, citing a job opportunity and improved support network. During the initial hearing, defendant requested an adjournment after receiving new information suggesting concerns about plaintiff’s mental-health treatment in Texas, the children’s absence from autism treatment, and a pending CPS investigation. The trial court granted the adjournment to allow additional evidence and witnesses.
 
Before the resumed hearing, plaintiff moved to exclude testimony from two witnesses concerning her past alcohol use, mental-health history, and rehabilitation stay. The trial court denied the motion without prejudice, indicating that evidentiary objections could be raised during testimony.
 
At the continued hearing, a CPS investigator testified that the investigation involved allegations against defendant and that both parents were considered fit, with no substantiated claims. Plaintiff also presented testimony confirming that she had received a job offer in Houston with a $110,000 salary and relocation package. Plaintiff argued the move would improve her financial stability and proposed a parenting-time schedule giving defendant extended summer parenting time and regular virtual contact with the children.
 
After considering the evidence, the trial court denied the motion to change domicile, concluding that the statutory factors under MCL 722.31(4) did not support relocation. The court also denied plaintiff’s motions for reconsideration, and plaintiff subsequently appealed the denial of the domicile change.
 
On appeal, Plaintiff challenged various findings by the trial court.  Plaintiff first challenged the trial court’s finding that the relocation would not improve the quality of life for the minor children. 
 
Under MCL 722.31(4)(a), the trial court found that the proposed change in domicile would improve plaintiff’s quality of life but that it would not improve the children’s quality of life. Specifically, it would not offset the children’s loss of high-quality services and programs or their frequent and regular contact with defendant. The trial court also found that the increase in plaintiff’s income did not outweigh the children’s frequent and regular contact with defendant. The court opined that defendant and his support system were necessary to provide oversight and protection for the children should plaintiff experience further mental-health or substance-abuse crises. These findings were not against the great weight of the evidence. See Rains, 301 Mich App at 324.
 
Plaintiff argued that her increase in income would be able to provide the children with services and programs they needed but could not afford, however, she failed to identify any services or programs that the children presently required that they did not have.  Plaintiff also argued that the proposed school in Houston would be better for the children, however, Plaintiff did not offer any evidence as to how the school would benefit the children or what services were available at the new school to address the children’s needs. 
 
Plaintiff also argued that the trial court erred by conducting its own “extrajudicial” fact finding.  At the initial hearing on the plaintiff’s motion to change the child’s domicile under MCL 722.31, the trial court scheduled two mornings for the evidentiary hearing and discussed time limits with the parties. The court indicated that, given the limited time, each party likely could not call more than three witnesses in addition to themselves. The court required the parties to submit witness lists identifying each witness by name and the subject matter of their testimony, and to identify any expert witnesses with their name, address, credentials, and area of expertise, along with any expert reports in advance.
 
The plaintiff later filed a witness list including four lay witnesses (including herself) and one expert witness and moved to exclude two witnesses from the court’s limit. The court issued subpoenas for two of the plaintiff’s in-state witnesses but declined to subpoena an out-of-state witness.
 
The court also refused to allow the plaintiff’s proposed expert witness, Donna King, Ph.D., J.D., who was offered to testify about coercive control and abuse. Applying MRE 702, the court concluded that the plaintiff had not shown the expert possessed specialized knowledge of Michigan custody and best-interest factors and determined that the expert’s testimony would not assist the court, which noted its own extensive experience in Michigan family law. Accordingly, the court denied the request to subpoena or allow the expert to testify.
 
MRE 611 provides, in part, the following:
(a) Control by the Court; Purposes. The court must exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence so as to:
(1) Make those procedures effective for determining the truth;
(2) Avoid wasting time; and
(3) Protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.
 
The Court of Appeals found that this type of conduct does not create an appearance of impropriety and does not violate any judicial canons. 
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling. 
 
Williams v Rambert, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued April 16, 2026 (Docket No. 377028) Oakland County
 
The parties were married in 2014 and had one child, RLR, born in 2015. Their 2020 consent judgment of divorce granted plaintiff sole legal and physical custody, with defendant entitled to 52 overnights annually, though in practice he exercised substantially more parenting time—seeing the child about four days per week with regular weekend overnights. RLR has Level 3 autism and is nonverbal, requiring extensive therapies, all of which were arranged by plaintiff; she also withdrew him from traditional schooling to homeschool him after determining his needs were not being met.
 
The parties’ arrangement remained informal and without court involvement until 2024, when plaintiff sought to relocate RLR to Texas and defendant countered with a request for joint legal custody. Following an evidentiary hearing, a referee recommended denying the relocation and granting defendant’s custody request. After plaintiff objected, the trial court conducted a de novo hearing and found that RLR had an established custodial environment with both parents, such that the proposed relocation would alter that environment. Applying the statutory best-interest factors, the court concluded it was in RLR’s best interests to maintain the existing arrangement with active involvement from both parents. Although the court denied plaintiff’s request to change domicile and granted defendant’s motion to modify custody, it did not provide a substantive analysis specifically addressing the change in legal custody. Plaintiff’s subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied.
 
Neither party contested that the trial court was required to analyze the factors in MCL 722.31(4).  Instead, Plaintiff alleged that the trial court failed to make sufficient best interest findings to support a modification of custody.  The Court of Appeals found that the trial court reached conclusions without providing any explanation for the rationale behind the decision. 
 
The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s order regarding the change of domicile and remanded the matter back to the trial court. 
 
Child Support
White v White, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued February 25, 2026 (Docket No. 369938) Wayne County
 
The parties married in 2006 and had two children, JW and CW. Plaintiff was a teacher with Detroit Public Schools, while defendant worked in real estate and later earned about $100,000 annually at Cinnaire Corporation. Plaintiff experienced periods of unemployment and later worked part-time after her literacy coach position was eliminated in 2018. The parties disagreed over whether her part-time work was by mutual agreement.
 
Financial strain and parenting disputes caused tension during the marriage. The couple accumulated credit card debt, and defendant took out a home equity line of credit. In 2021, defendant restricted plaintiff’s access to a joint bank account. After a January 2022 argument, plaintiff moved out with the children and filed for divorce the following month. The children primarily remained in plaintiff’s care, and defendant was granted supervised parenting time. Defendant filed for bankruptcy in 2022 but continued paying some household expenses. He was not required to pay interim child support until April 2023.
 
During the divorce proceedings, defendant received $250,000 in life insurance proceeds after his father’s death and used the funds to purchase a truck and a home in Detroit. At trial, plaintiff alleged verbal, emotional, financial, and physical abuse by defendant toward her and CW; defendant denied abuse, characterizing his actions as corporal punishment. The parties disputed custody, parenting time, support, and division of assets.
 
In January 2024, the trial court issued a divorce judgment dividing the marital estate, denying plaintiff spousal support and attorney fees, and imputing income to her for child support calculations. Plaintiff was awarded the marital home and a condominium (and their equity) but was made responsible for the related mortgages and HELOC and ordered to refinance the marital home within 90 days. Defendant received the Detroit home and other assets, and plaintiff received half of the life insurance proceeds. Defendant was granted unsupervised parenting time, with overnight visits contingent on completion of reunification therapy. Plaintiff appealed the decision.
 
Plaintiff argued that the trial court erred by imputing income to her and by awarding Defendant the ability to claim a minor child as a dependent for tax purposes despite the fact that Defendant does not exercise any overnights. 
 
“[A] trial court has the discretion to impute income when a parent voluntarily reduces or eliminates income or when it finds that the parent has a voluntarily unexercised ability to earn.” Carlson v Carlson, 293 Mich App 203, 205-206; 809 NW2d 612 (2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “However, a court’s decision to impute income must be supported by adequate fact-finding that the parent has an actual ability and likelihood of earning the imputed income.” Id. at 206 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The trial court must first find that the parent is “voluntarily unemployed, underemployed, or has an unexercised ability to earn.” Clarke v Clarke, 297 Mich App 172, 183; 823 NW2d 318 (2012). 2021 Then, the MCSF instructs that the trial court consider several factors to determine whether the parent has an actual ability to earn and a reasonable likelihood of earning the potential income. Id.; MCSF 2.01(G)(2).
 
The trial court failed to make a finding (on the record) as to what the child support would be ordered if the Michigan Child Support Formula was applied (using Plaintiff’s actual income of $30/hour at 10-20 hours per week) and did not make any findings regarding the imputation factors pursuant to MCSF 2.01(G)(2). 
 
[I]t is within the general authority of the trial court to award the federal income tax dependency exemption for the minor children to either party.” Fear v Rogers, 207 Mich App 642, 645; 526 NW2d 197 (1994). “[T]he income tax dependency exemption is closely associated with issues involving child support. . . .” Id. at 645-646. “[T]he appropriate allocation of the income tax dependency exemption can increase the total disposable income available to the parties and, therefore, can be factored into an increased child support award.” Id. at 646.
 
In this case, because the trial court failed to make findings under the MCSF, it erred by awarding Defendant the tax exemption, as doing so affected his disposable income and, consequently, the amount of support to be paid.
 
The Court of Appeals vacated the child support award and remanded the matter back to the trial court.