DOMESTIC CASELAW UPDATE

BY RYAN O'NEIL (OAKLAND)

​Custody
 
Assemany v. Assemany, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued January 15, 2025 (Docket No. 371694, 371832), Lapeer County.
 
The parties’ judgment awarded Father sole legal and physical custody of the minor children. Mother resided in Florida, while Father lived in Michigan. Mother was granted unsupervised parenting time, which could take place in either Michigan or Florida. The parties and children also participated in reunification therapy.
 
In 2022, following a motion filed by Father, the trial court entered an order maintaining Father’s sole legal and physical custody of the children. The order also suspended reunification therapy between Mother and two (2) of the minor children. However, Mother was to continue reunification therapy with the parties’ third child and was assigned a graduated parenting time schedule contingent upon her sobriety.
 
Approximately six (6) months later, an order was entered suspending Mother’s parenting time entirely. She was also prohibited from communicating with the parties’ youngest child. Nearly a year after this order, Mother filed a motion to reinstate parenting time and requested joint legal custody. She alleged that Father and the child’s therapist had alienated the child from her. To support her claims against the therapist, Mother retained her own therapist, who issued a report raising concerns about the child’s therapist.

At a hearing on Mother’s motion, Father’s attorney stated on the record that they had not yet received a copy of the motion and had requested an adjournment, which Mother’s counsel refused to grant. The trial court noted that it would not be able to hear the matter again for another three (3) to four (4) months and suggested referring the matter to a referee for a hearing. Father’s counsel argued that Mother had failed to make a threshold showing to warrant a hearing on the modification of custody and parenting time. The trial court, however, stated that it was “satisfied there was a significant change of circumstances if nothing but time that’s gone by.”
 
Father’s counsel further contended that proceeding with a hearing based on an exhibit not yet presented to him violated due process. The trial court responded, stating: “Yeah, [Father is] gonna get a hearing, so that’s his due process. I am simply referring it to the Referee for a hearing . . . and it’ll include the issue of joint legal. You can argue it.”
 
On appeal, Father argued that the trial court erred in referring the matter to the Friend of the Court for a hearing without first addressing whether Mother had demonstrated either proper cause and/or a change in circumstances. 
 
In a child-custody dispute, a custody order or parenting time order may only be altered “for
proper cause shown or because of change of circumstances” if it is in the best interest of the child. MCL 722.27(1)(c).​

Before custody may be modified, “the trial court must determine whether the change of custody is in the children’s best interests and . . . make specific findings of fact regarding each of the twelve statutory best-interest factors.” Johnson v Johnson, 329 Mich App 110, 128-129; 940 NW2d 807 (2019).
 
If a trial court inadequately adjudicates a child-custody matter, and the resulting error is not harmless, the proper remedy is to remand for reassessment or for a new child custody hearing. Barretta v Zhitkov, ___ Mich App ___ ; ___ NW3d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 364921); slip op at 10.
 
[T]o establish “proper cause” necessary to revisit a custody order, a movant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of an appropriate ground for legal action to be taken by the trial court. The appropriate ground(s) should be relevant to at least one of the twelve statutory best interest factors, and must be of such magnitude to have a significant effect on the child’s well-being.
 
[I]n order to establish a “change of circumstances,” a movant must prove that, since the entry of the last custody order, the conditions surrounding custody of the child, which have or could have a significant effect on the child’s well-being, have materially changed. Again, not just any change will suffice, for over time there will always be some changes in a child’s environment, behavior, and well-being. Instead, the evidence must demonstrate something more than the normal life changes (both good and bad) that occur during the life of a child, and there must be at least some evidence that the material changes have had or will almost certainly have an effect on the child.
 
[A]n evidentiary hearing is not required to answer the initial factual question of whether proper cause or change in circumstances exists, because “[o]ften times, the facts alleged to constitute proper cause or a change of circumstances will be undisputed, or the court can accept as true the facts allegedly comprising proper cause or a change of circumstances, and then decide if they are legally sufficient to satisfy the standard.” [odvarka v Grasmeyer, 259 Mich App 499, 512-514; 675 NW2d 847 (2003).]

The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court properly considered whether there was a change in circumstances and/or proper cause before referring the matter to the Friend of the Court. However, while the trial court stated it was “satisfied,” it failed to make the requisite findings. Additionally, the trial court did not address the “substantive allegations” raised in Mother’s motion.

The trial court also erred by incorrectly applying the “normal life changes” threshold outlined in Shade v Wright, 291 Mich App 17; 805 NW2d 1 (2010). The Court of Appeals clarified that while the passage of time may constitute the type of “normal life change” that would permit a reconsideration of parenting time, this standard was inapplicable here because Mother was seeking to modify both parenting time and legal custody.

The Court of Appeals rejected Father’s argument that Mother’s failure to timely provide copies of the exhibits denied him due process. However, the Court added a note regarding the conduct of Mother’s attorney:

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling referring the matter to the Friend of the Court for a hearing and remanded the matter back to the trial court. 
 
Radlinski v. Putt, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued March 17, 2025 (Docket No. 371608), Bay County.

Father and Mother were married for twenty-one (21) years and had one (1) minor child. At the time of the divorce, they resided in Bay City. Father worked in Battle Creek, which required a four-hour (4) round-trip commute. Mother worked as a physical therapist. During the marriage, Father rented two (2) apartments and engaged in extramarital affairs.

Following a trial, the court awarded the parties joint legal custody of the minor child and granted Mother sole physical custody. The court assigned Father responsibility for two (2) outstanding home-improvement loans. He was also required to pay for the Survivor Benefits Program, ensuring that Mother would receive a portion of his military pension if he predeceased her.

Mother was awarded the marital home, two (2) vehicles, her personal checking and savings accounts, her retirement accounts, and one-half of Father’s pension. She was also assigned responsibility for the outstanding mortgage balance on the marital home and her student loans. Additionally, Father was ordered to pay Mother $1,500 per month in spousal support.

On appeal, Father challenged the trial court’s ruling regarding three (3) best interest factors. 

We note, however, that while mother’s counsel’s conduct may not have violated due process considerations, it fell below not only the standards of our court rules, but the expectations for how counsel should engage with one another. Clients are not well served when their lawyers fail to maintain objectivity and professionalism. Gaming and toying with opposing counsel denigrates the process, can add costs to litigation, and deprives minor children of resources that could otherwise be used for their welfare. Extending professional courtesies on both sides should be commonplace.

Factor (d) addresses “[t]he length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity.” MCL 722.23(d). “Factor (d) is properly addressed by considering the environments in which the child has lived in the past and the desirability of maintaining the continuity of those environments.” Demski v Petlick, 309 Mich App 404, 448-449; 873 NW2d 596 (2015).​

The Court of Appeals rejected Father’s argument that the trial court erred by considering the fact that the minor child would continue to reside in the marital home and penalized Father for moving into a new home.  The Court opined that the factor requires a trial court to consider the “continuity” of a child’s home environment.  

​Factor (e) concerns “[t]he permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home or homes.” MCL 722.23(e). In assessing this factor, courts should focus on the permanence of the custodial unit, rather than its acceptability. See Ireland v Smith, 451 Mich 457, 464; 547 NW2d 686 (1996).

While the trial court erred in finding that Father had an apartment in Battle Creek, when no such evidence was introduced, the Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that this factor favored Mother.  Father still had a four (4) hour commute to and from work, and this commute would make establishing permanence in his new residence difficult.

Factor f (moral fitness), like all the other statutory factors, relates to a person’s fitness as a parent. To evaluate parental fitness, courts must look to the parent-child relationship and the effect that the conduct at issue will have on that relationship. Thus, the question under factor f is not “who is the morally superior adult;” the question concerns the parties’ relative fitness to provide for their child, given the moral disposition of each party as demonstrated by individual conduct. We hold that in making that finding, questionable conduct is relevant to factor f only if it is a type of conduct that necessarily has a significant influence on how one will function as a parent. Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 886-887; 526 NW2d 889 (1994).

The trial court ruled that Factor (F) favored Mother due to Father’s extramarital affairs. However, the Court of Appeals determined that this finding was erroneous, as there was no evidence that Father’s conduct negatively impacted his ability to parent the minor child.
 
Despite this error, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court had properly evaluated other factors that favored Mother. As a result, the trial court’s erroneous finding regarding Factor (F) was deemed harmless, and the Court affirmed the custody order.
 
Quint III v. Quint, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued April 10, 2025 (Docket No. 373152), Ionia County.
 
The facts of this case are contained in Quint v Quint, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ ​(2024) (Docket No. 368002):
 
Father and Mother shared legal custody of their minor child, with parenting time as agreed by the parties. Father filed a motion to modify custody, alleging that Mother was interfering with the child’s education and medical care, accusing teachers and care providers of racism.
 
The trial court found that the proposed change would not alter the established custodial environment but applied the clear and convincing standard nonetheless. The trial court determined that four of the best interest factors favored both parties, while six favored Father. However, the trial court did not consider the child’s reasonable preference, noting that neither party requested it and questioning whether interviewing the child would be appropriate.

On remand, the trial court interviewed the minor child.  An evidentiary hearing was then conducted.  Father testified that the child had adjusted well to the new parenting schedule, with improved school performance and no negative effects. Father and Mother disagreed on the child’s medical care, with Father preferring to wait on minor illnesses while Mother sought immediate treatment, often without informing Father. Mother recorded parenting exchanges and submitted videos showing Father criticizing her and driving the child without a car seat, leading to police involvement. Mother had made two CPS reports against Father, but neither was substantiated.

Mother testified about taking the minor child to church and preparing him for First Communion, as well as incidents involving police threats over parenting exchanges. She admitted to recording some exchanges and hospital visits and stated that she was receiving therapy and medication for depression since the custody change.

The trial court considered the previous hearing, a child interview, and updated information. It found six best-interest factors favored both parents and several factors (e.g., guidance, stable environment, moral fitness, cooperation) favored Father. The court emphasized Mother’s ongoing disagreements with plaintiff's parenting decisions, particularly medical ones, and found many of her complaints lacked merit.

Ultimately, the court reaffirmed joint physical custody, granted sole legal custody to Father, and maintained the parenting time schedule, prompting Mother’s appeal.

The Court of Appeals rejected Mother’s claim that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings related to the best interest factors, noting that “the trial court made ‘brief, definite and pertinent findings.’”

Mother also appealed the trial court’s failure to have a court reporter present during the in-camera interview. Mother cited Molloy v. Molloy, 247 Mich App 348; 637 NW2d 803 (2001), which held that “all in-camera interviews of children in custody cases must be recorded and sealed for appellate review.” However, this ruling was vacated by the Michigan Supreme Court in Molloy v. Molloy, 466 Mich 852; 643 NW2d 574 (2002). Subsequently, the Michigan Supreme Court adopted MCR 3.210(C)(5), which provides that a minor child may be interviewed “privately to determine if the child is of sufficient age to express a preference regarding custody, and if so, the reasonable preference of the child.”

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling. 

Grandparenting Time
 
Lawrence v. Lawrence, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued April 7, 2025 (Docket No. 373170), Oakland County.
 
Mother and Father had one (1) minor child together.  When the child was one (1), Father passed away.  For a three (3) month period in 2019, Mother and the minor child resided with Father’s parents (“Grandparents”).   Grandparents continued to see the minor child including overnight visits until 2021.  Mother stopped allowing the minor child to see Grandparents after the minor child had a seizure while under their care.  Mother thought their behavior had become too controlling.   Following a bench trial, the trial court found that the Grandparents had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Mother’s decision to deny Grandparents time with the minor child created a substantial risk of harm to the child’s mental, physical, and/or emotional health.  The trial court further found that it was in the child’s best interests for the Grandparents to have grandparenting time with the minor child. 
 
On appeal, Mother argued that the trial court erred in finding that her decision to deny grandparenting time created a risk of harm to the minor child.  MCL 722.27b(1)(c) permits a grandparent to request court ordered grandparenting time if the child’s parent, who is also the child of the grandparent, passes away. 

In order to give deference to the decisions of fit parents, it is presumed in a proceeding under this subsection that a fit parent’s decision to deny grandparenting time does not create a substantial risk of harm to the child’s mental, physical, or emotional health.” A fit parent is one who “adequately cares for his or her children.
 
In order to successfully rebut this presumption, a grandparent “must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the parent’s decision to deny grandparenting time creates a substantial risk of harm to the child’s mental, physical, or emotional health.” MCL 722.27b(4)(b). If the grandparent fails to do so, the court must dismiss the action for grandparenting time. Geering v King, 320 Mich App 182, 191; 906 NW2d 214 (2017).

The trial court made findings that Grandparents were involved in the child’s life.  They took him to medical appointments, chaperoned field trips, etc.  Evidence also demonstrated that the child enjoyed spending time with his Grandparents.  The trial court also found Mother to not be a credible witness.  The trial court also found that the minor child struggle with not seeing his Grandparents. 
 
If the presumption is rebutted, the trial court must then consider the following best interest factors:

​(a) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the grandparent and the child.
 
(b) The length and quality of the prior relationship between the child and the grandparent, the role performed by the grandparent, and the existing emotional ties of the child to the grandparent.
 
(c) The grandparent’s moral fitness.
 
(d) The grandparent’s mental and physical health.
 
(e) The child’s reasonable preference, if the court considers the child to be of sufficient age to express a preference.
 
(f) The effect on the child of hostility between the grandparent and the parent of the child.
 
(g) T he willingness of the grandparent, except in the case of abuse or neglect, to encourage a close relationship between the child and the parent or parents of the child.
 
(h) Any history of physical, emotional, or sexual abuse or neglect of any child by the grandparent.
 
(i) Whether the parent’s decision to deny, or lack of an offer of, grandparenting time is related to the child’s well-being or is for some other unrelated reason.
 
(j) Any other factor relevant to the physical and psychological well-being of the child.
 
MCL 722.27b(6)(a) through (j).

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s best interest findings.  The trial court found that the minor child not only loved and showed affection with Grandparents, but that they were regularly involved in his care.  The trial court also relied on the testimony of Dr. Richard Wooten who testified that “grandparenting time should be increased when there is hostility between parties to ‘buffer the effects of that negatively between the adults.’” 
 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling. 
 
Paternity
 
Lyra v. King, ___ Mich App ___,  ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 369216) (February 19, 2025)
 
Plaintiff/Mother resides in Brazil with the minor child. Mother alleges that Defendant is the child's father. Defendant does not dispute that he and Plaintiff were in a relationship at the time of the child's birth. Plaintiff filed an application for child support under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”). The application indicated that Defendant’s paternity had been established and/or presumed in Brazil, with a birth certificate attached. Plaintiff’s application was directed to the Livingston County Prosecutor. Defendant responded to the complaint, denying that he was the child's father, yet simultaneously filed his own paternity action, alleging that he was the child's father.
 
In the UIFSA action, the parties disputed whether Defendant’s paternity had been established under Brazilian law. Plaintiff argued that, under Brazilian law, the execution of a birth certificate is sufficient to establish paternity. She further asserted that Defendant executed an Affidavit of Paternity (“AOP”) at the United States Consulate to obtain a passport for the minor child. Additionally, Defendant sued Plaintiff, alleging that she had abducted the child.
 
The trial court entered a final order finding that Defendant had been legally established as the child's father under Brazilian law. Defendant was ordered to pay monthly child support.
 
On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred by making a finding as to his parentage of the minor child pursuant to Brazilian law. 

According to the Office of Child Support Services within the United States Department of Health & Human Services, the United States has established a reciprocal arrangement for child support services with Brazil.3 Articles 1 through 6 of the UIFSA therefore apply in this case. Because plaintiff’s application was submitted under the Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance, concluded at The Hauge on November 23, 2007 (the Convention), see MCL 552.2102(c), Article 7 applies in this case, as well as Articles 1 through 6. See MCL 552.2702.
 
MCL 552.2704 provides that the obligee seeking child support is entitled to proceedings for “[e]stablishment of a support order if there is no existing order, including, if necessary, determination of parentage of a child.” MCL 552.2704(2)(c) (emphasis added).
 
Proceedings involving the establishment of a support order are addressed in Article 4 of the UIFSA, MCL 552.2401 et seq. Article 4 authorizes the trial court to issue a support order under the following circumstances, in relevant part:
 
(1) If a support order entitled to recognition under this act has not been issued, a responding tribunal of this state with personal jurisdiction over the parties may issue a support order if either of the following apply:
 
(a) The individual seeking the order resides outside this state.
 
(b) The support enforcement agency seeking the order is located outside this state.

* * *
 
(3) Upon finding, after notice and opportunity to be heard, that an obligor owes a duty of support, the tribunal shall issue a support order directed to the obligor and may issue other orders under section 305. MCL 552.2401.

The Court of Appeals held that the trial court was empowered under UIFSA to issue an order for child support but only after making a finding—and giving Defendant an opportunity to be heard—that he owed a duty of support. The Court of Appeals identified the central issue as whether the trial court “properly found that Defendant had a duty of support before ordering Defendant to pay child support.”
 
The trial court accepted Plaintiff’s argument that, under Brazilian law, the child’s name appearing on the birth certificate established paternity, thereby precluding Defendant from challenging paternity under Section 315 of UIFSA. However, the trial court was obligated to “apply the procedural and substantive law, generally applicable to similar proceedings originating in this state. . .” MCL 552.2303a. Under Michigan law, Plaintiff had the burden to prove that Defendant’s paternity had been established under Brazilian law, which she failed to do.
 
The Court of Appeals clarified that the issue was not whether Defendant is the child’s father or whether he held himself out as the child’s father. Rather, the issue was whether Defendant was precluded from challenging parentage due to a prior determination in Brazil. In the underlying action, Defendant had argued that paternity still needed to be established.
 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s order and remanded the matter for further proceedings. On remand, Plaintiff must demonstrate that parentage has been legally determined under Brazilian law or, alternatively, that Defendant is permitted to challenge the child’s parentage.
 
Child Support
 
Brewart v. Brewart, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued April 9, 2025 (Docket No. 369046), Macomb County.

The parties married in 2014 and had two children. In 2018, Father filed for divorce and requested child support based on the Michigan Child Support Formula (MCSF). Two recommendations were made based on Father’s imputed income due to unemployment. One recommendation (156 overnights with Father) required Mother to pay $190/month; the other (52 overnights with plaintiff) required Father to pay $285/month.

However, the parties agreed in court to a Judgment of Divorce (JOD) and a Uniform Child Support Order (UCSO) that did not follow either recommendation. Instead, they stipulated that Father would pay defendant $800/month for both children, without an MCSF deviation addendum or explanation.

Over the following years, Father filed multiple motions to reduce his child support obligation, citing unaffordability and changes in Mother’s income. The court denied the motions, finding no substantial change in Father’s circumstances, as he remained unemployed. Father later argued that the original child support amount was a deviation from the MCSF without proper documentation or justification. Despite acknowledging procedural issues, the referee and trial court denied his motions, emphasizing that Father did not object initially and had no significant change in circumstances. Father appealed. 

​Generally, to establish a level of child support, trial courts must follow the formula set forth in the MCSF Manual. See Burba v Burba (After Remand), 461 Mich 637, 642-643; 610 NW2d 873 (2000); Holmes v Holmes, 281 Mich App 575, 588-589; 760 NW2d 300 (2008). The MCSF is “based upon the needs of the child and the actual resources of each parent.” MCL 552.519(3)(a)(vi); Burba, 461 Mich at 643. However, under MCL 552.605, trial courts have discretion to deviate from the award calculated by the MCSF in certain circumstances. See MCL 552.605(2)(a)-(d). The statutory criteria for deviating from the child support formula are mandatory. Burba, 461 Mich at 644.

The Court of Appeals found that Father was not entitled to relief because his claims were an impressible collateral attack on the Judgment of Divorce and the 2018 Uniform Child Support Order.  “The failure of a party to appeal from an original JOD operates as a stipulation to the provisions in that judgment, and a party cannot later collaterally attack the validity of that judgment through a motion to modify child support.”  Kosch v Kosch, 233 Mich App 346, 353; 592 NW2d 434 (1999).  Since Father agreed to pay more in support than what was called for by the Michigan Child Support Formula and then failed to appeal the lack of a deviation addendum or other documentation, he is prohibited from raising that issue now. 

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling. 

Procedural

Rose v. May, ___ Mich App ___,  ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 371605) (March 3,  2025), Gladwin County.

A referral was sent to the Gladwin County Prosecutor’s Office (“PA”) from the Office of Child Support, requesting that a paternity action be initiated on behalf of the minor child. A complaint was filed, alleging that the minor child was born out of wedlock and that Defendant was the child’s father. Defendant did not answer the complaint, nor did he appear for court-ordered genetic testing. The PA filed a motion to enter an Order of Filiation and a support order. A hearing was held, which Defendant also failed to attend. The PA informed the trial court that Defendant had been served and had failed to communicate with their office. Plaintiff testified that she and Defendant had two (2) minor children together and further alleged that a support order (for $0/month) had been entered in Oakland County. However, she believed that the case had been transferred to Gladwin County.

Before the trial court could enter an Order of Filiation and child support order, the Gladwin County Friend of the Court (“FOC”) filed a motion to set aside the trial court’s findings and dismiss the complaint. The FOC argued that, because the parties had an existing case in Oakland County involving their first child, MCR 3.204 required Plaintiff to file her action in Oakland County. The trial court agreed and issued an order setting aside the findings and dismissing the complaint.

The PA then filed a motion requesting that the order of dismissal be set aside, arguing that Gladwin County had subject matter jurisdiction and that the FOC did not have the authority to file a motion to dismiss. The trial court denied the PA’s motion.

On appeal, Plaintiff argued that subject matter was proper in Gladwin County. 

The Court of Appeals ruled that Plaintiff filed a complaint in Gladwin County and attached an affidavit verifying that she had resided in Gladwin County for the prior five (5) years.  As such, subject matter jurisdiction was proper in Gladwin County,
 
Plaintiff next argued that venue was proper in the Gladwin County Circuit Court. ​

Circuit courts have original jurisdiction to hear and determine all civil claims and remedies, except where exclusive jurisdiction is given in the constitution or by statute to some other court or where the circuit courts are denied jurisdiction by the constitution or statutes of this state.” MCL 600.605
 
[T]he Paternity Act patently grants the circuit court subject-matter jurisdiction to determine the paternity of a child born out of wedlock and to order child support.” Teran v Rittley, 313 Mich App 197, 205; 882 NW2d 181 (2015).​

The general venue statute provides that venue for civil actions is determined as follows:
 
(a) The county in which a defendant resides, has a place of business, or conducts business…, is a proper county in which to commence and try an action
 
(b) If none of the defendants meet 1 or more criteria in subdivision (a), the county in which a plaintiff resides or has a place of business…, is a proper county in which to commence and try an action. [MCL 600.1621].

The Paternity Act, in pertinent part, provides as follows:

(1) An action under this act shall be brought in the circuit court by the mother, the father… or the department of human services as provided in this act. The Michigan court rules for civil actions apply to all proceedings under this act. A complaint shall be filed in the county where the mother or child resides.
 
* * *
 
(12) If a child born out of wedlock is being supported in whole or in part by public assistance, including medical assistance, the department of human services may file a complaint on behalf of the child in the circuit court in the county in which the child resides. The mother or alleged father of the child shall be made a party plaintiff and notified of the hearing on the complaint by summons. The complaint made by the department of human services shall be verified by the director of the department of human services, or his or her designated representative, or by the director of the county department of human services of the county in which an action is brought, or the county director's designated representative. [MCL 722.714.]

The FOC argued that MCR 3.204 should govern as to where the parties may initiate proceedings, and that the court rule trumps MCL 722.714 as Father continued to reside in Oakland County.  MCR 3.204 provides the following:​

MCL 722.714(1) requires that a Plaintiff initiate a paternity action in the county in which either the mother or the minor child resides.  However, MCR 3204 states that a new action for support for a different child of the same parents be filed in the same county as the prior action. 

(A) Unless the court orders otherwise for good cause, if a circuit court action involving child support, custody, or parenting time is pending, or if the circuit court has continuing jurisdiction over such matters because of a prior action:
 
* * *
 
(2) A new action for the support, custody, or parenting time of a different child of the same parents must be filed in the same county as the prior action if the circuit court for that county has jurisdiction over the new action and the new case must be assigned to the same judge to whom the previous action was assigned.

The Court of Appeals found that MCL 722.714 addresses the policy of providing support for children born out of wedlock and specifically requires that a paternity action be filed in the county where either the mother or minor child resides. The court further held that “the mandatory venue provision of the statute is most appropriately categorized as a substantive rule dictating the proper venue for a paternity complaint.” The minor child in this case was not born in Oakland County and never resided there. Accordingly, the Court ruled that the statute supersedes the court rule.
 
Finally, Plaintiff argued that the FOC did not have the authority to file a motion to dismiss. 

According to our Supreme Court, a statutory rule of evidence violates art 6, § 5 only when “no clear legislative policy reflecting considerations other than judicial dispatch of litigation can be identified.” McDougall v Schanz, 461 Mich 15, 30; 597 NW2d 148 (1999) “Therefore, if a particular court rule contravenes a legislatively declared principle of public policy, having as its basis something other than court administration… the court rule should yield.” Id.

After the PA challenged the FOC’s authority to file a motion setting aside the trial court’s findings, the trial court described the FOC as an “arm of this court” and treated the motion as a de factor “sua sponte motion” being filed by the court.  
 
The Court of Appeals found that the FOC’s motion to supplement the record would fall within the investigative and fact-finding responsibilities of the office.  However, the motion to dismiss did not serve either an investigative or fact-finding function.  Accordingly, the Court found that the FOC lacked authority to file a motion to dismiss. 
 
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order dismissing the paternity complaint. 

“The intent of the Legislature in enacting the [FCA] . . . was to create an investigative and fact finding arm of the circuit court in domestic relations matters.” Denhof v Challa, 311 Mich App 499, 514-515; 876 NW2d 266 (2015).
 
The FOC’s duties are those which “involve either the dissemination of information to the parties or the investigation and compilation of facts for use by the circuit court judge.” Id. at 515.
 
Pursuant to the FCA, the FOC may enforce support orders, orders for the payment of healthcare expenses, custody orders, and parenting-time orders.  Id. at 516.